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Abstract
The NRL Protocol Analyzer (NPA) is a tool for the formal speciﬁcation and analysis of cryptographic protocols that has been
used with great effect on a number of complex real-life protocols. One of the most interesting of its features is that it can be used
to reason about security in face of attempted attacks on low-level algebraic properties of the functions used in a protocol. Indeed, it
has been used successfully to either reproduce or discover a number of such attacks. In this paper we give for the ﬁrst time a precise
formal speciﬁcation of the main features of the NPA inference system: its grammar-based techniques for invariant generation and
its backwards reachability analysis method. This formal speciﬁcation is given within the well-known rewriting framework so that
the inference system is speciﬁed as a set of rewrite rules modulo an equational theory describing the behavior of the cryptographic
algorithms involved. We then use this formalization to prove some important meta-logical properties about the NPA inference
system, including the soundness and completeness of the search algorithm and soundness of the grammar generation algorithm.
The formalization and soundness and completeness theorems not only provide also a better understanding of the NPA as it currently
operates, but provide a modular basis which can be used as a starting point for increasing the types of equational theories it can
handle.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The NRL Protocol Analyzer (NPA) [21] is a tool for the formal speciﬁcation and analysis of cryptographic protocols
that has been used with great effect on a number of complex real-life protocols. One of the most interesting of its
features is that it can be used, not only to prove or disprove authentication and secrecy properties using the standard
Dolev–Yao model [10], but also to reason about security in face of attempted attacks on low-level algebraic properties
of the functions used in a protocol. Indeed, it has been used successfully to either reproduce or discover a number of
such attacks, ranging from the discovery of an authentication attack based on the cancellation properties of encryption
and decryption [18], to the reproduction of Bellovin’s attack on a version of the Encapsulating Security Protocol that
used cipher block chaining to the discovery of a sophisticated type confusion attack [30,23] that resulted in the redesign
of a draft for a protocol standard.
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NPA’s ability to reason well about these low-level functionalities is its combination of symbolic reachability analysis
using narrowing, together with its techniques for reducing the size of the search space. On one hand, uniﬁcation modulo
algebraic properties (e.g., encryption and decryption, concatenation and deconcatenation) as narrowing using a ﬁnite
convergent set of rewrite rules [1] allows the tool to represent behavior which is not captured by the usual Dolev–Yao
free algebra model. On the other hand, techniques for reducing the size of the search space by using inductively deﬁned
co-invariants 1 describing states unreachable to an intruder allows us to start with an inﬁnite search space, and reduce it
in many cases to a ﬁnite one, thus freeing us from the requirement to put any a priori limits on the number of sessions.
The NPA’s use of inductive co-invariants, which are deﬁned using grammars similar to tree grammars, has been
shown [22] to be related to structures used in other formalisms, such as strand space ideals [12] and rank functions [14].
Indeed, we believe that many of the techniques that have been developed for grammar generation for the NPA could be
applied with proﬁt to other systems and some other NPA search space reduction techniques, such as its use of a form
of partial order reduction [29], might also prove useful for other systems. Moreover, the NPA’s reliance on rewriting
and narrowing [31,24] suggests that it could by proﬁtably compared with other protocol analysis systems that rely on
rewriting. However, the adoption of NPA language generation techniques has been hampered by the fact that up to now
the techniques have lacked an independent formal speciﬁcation and model, and instead were closely intertwined with
other NPA features.
One key contribution of this paper is to rectify this problem by giving for the ﬁrst time a precise formal speciﬁcation
of the main features of the NPA inference system: its backwards reachability analysis method and its grammar-based
techniques for co-invariant generation; both implemented in Maude. We will use the word Maude-NPA to refer to
both this formal speciﬁcation of the original NPA and its Maude implementation. Maude-NPA is given within the
well-known rewriting framework so that the inference system is speciﬁed as a set of rewrite rules modulo an equational
theory describing the behavior of the cryptographic functions involved. A second key contribution of this work is to
use the rewriting formalism of the Maude-NPA inference system as a model to prove meta-logical properties about
such an inference system. Speciﬁcally, we prove the soundness and completeness of its search algorithm, so that the
tool will discover an attack of the type speciﬁed by the user if and only if such an attack exists at the level of abstraction
supported by themodel.We also prove the unreachability of the states characterized by grammars, thus showing that the
drastic state space reductions afforded by such grammars do not compromise the completeness of the search algorithm.
Finally, we have implemented the reachability analysis and language generation techniques in the Maude rewriting
logic language, and have used it to generate the formal tree languages used in this paper.
Besides the above-mentioned related work on inductive invariants [12,14], our Maude-NPA rewriting-based formal-
ization facilitates the comparison of NPA with other narrowing-based protocol analysis methods and tools. We do not
give here precise comparisons, nor do we try to be exhaustive, but mention some representative approaches. Some
of the narrowing-based mechanisms that we discuss have similarities with those used in the OFMC symbolic model
checker tool for protocol analysis [2]. Our work is also related to recent studies and decision procedures to ﬁnd attacks
that may use knowledge of algebraic properties of the underlying cryptographic functions [8,27,5,6]. Indeed, as pointed
out in [26], narrowing can be viewed as a general inference mechanism unifying many of those analyses. Our rewriting
semantics makes clear that the Maude-NPA tool—and its planned extension to support many other analysis of attacks
that use knowledge of the algebraic properties of the underlying cryptographic functions—occupies a middle ground
between unrestricted (but semi-decidable) narrowing analysis and the decidable, but necessarily restricted, cases for
which decision procedures such as those cited above exist.
This work should also be viewed as a ﬁrst step towards reaching a number of longer-term goals. We are currently
working on extending the Maude-NPA’s inference system to support the analysis of cryptographic protocols under a
wider range of algebraic properties than it currently is capable of, with the ultimate plan of building a next-generation
rewriting-based analysis tool that takes into account the algebraic properties of the underlying cryptographic functions.
A precise speciﬁcation of the semantics of the Maude-NPA’s inference system in terms of rewrite rules will allow
us to cleanly separate out reasoning modulo algebraic properties of the cryptographic algorithms used by the system
from the rest of the inference mechanism, paving the way for the insertion of new algebraic properties in a modular
fashion. Moreover, we expect that the current formal speciﬁcation and the proofs of the meta-logical properties will also
1 We call here inductively deﬁned sets of unreachable states co-invariants, since they are in a sense dual to invariants, which are reachability-closed
sets of states.
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provide a good basis for specifying the inference system of, and prove meta-logical properties for, this more general
next-generation tool.
We start with an overview of theNPA in Section 2 and some preliminaries in Section 3.We introduce the notation used
for describing protocols in Section 4. In Section 5, we show how the reachability analysis is performed using grammars
to cut down the search space. Then, in Section 6, we ﬁrst informally explain how the Maude-NPA tool ﬁnds grammars
deﬁning co-invariants and then formally describe how these grammars are generated. We use the Needham–Schroeder
Protocol [28] as the guiding example along the paper. We conclude in Section 7.
2. NPA overview
In theNPA, protocols are represented in terms of communicating statemachines. The statemachines communicate by
sending messages to an intruder, who has the usual ability to read and redirect trafﬁc, and can also perform operations,
e.g., encryption, decryption, concatenation, etc. on messages that it has received. Intruder operations are described
in terms of the intruder sending messages to itself. All states and protocol rules are described symbolically, using a
mixture of variables and constants, so a single speciﬁcation can stand formultiple instances. There is no restriction in the
number of principals, number of sessions, nonces, time, or local state values, i.e., no data abstraction or approximation
is performed. It is also possible to include algebraic properties of the operators (cryptographic and otherwise) that can
be expressed in terms of a ﬁnite set of rewrite rules and it also allows limited support for commutativity.
Analysis is done in NPA via backwards narrowing search from an (insecure) goal state. Output states of the protocol
rules are (E-)uniﬁed with subterms of goal states via narrowing using an equational theory E. Speciﬁcally, NPA allows
only equational theories that can be oriented into a ﬁnite convergent set of rewrite rules where the right-hand side of
each rule is either a subterm of the left-hand side or a ground term [16,9]. NPA can either: (i) ﬁnd an attack, i.e., a
protocol run from the insecure state to an initial state, (ii) prove the protocol secure, i.e., the search space is ﬁnite and
no protocol run was found, or (iii) fail to terminate.
The NPA includes a number of ways for recognizing that a state is unreachable by an intruder, thus reducing the
size of the search space. We describe the two most important ones as follows. The ﬁrst, upon which much of the other
NPA state space reduction functionality is built, is the notion of an intruder learning a term at a concrete moment in
a protocol run. The NPA sets a condition that an intruder learns each term only once, and a history of all terms that
an intruder will learn in the future is kept by the NPA in its backwards search. Note that this history is just the set
of messages found by backwards search from the goal state till the present state. If, as the search proceeds, the NPA
encounters a state in which the intruder knows a term which we positively know that the intruder will only learn at
some moment in the future (i.e., it is actually in the current history) and thus it cannot be known at the present moment,
then the NPA discards that state as unreachable.
Example 1. Consider a protocol with only two operations, encryption, represented by e(K,X), and decryption, rep-
resented by d(K,X), where K is the key and X is the message. These operations satisfy the cancellation properties
d(K, e(K,X)) = X and e(K, d(K,X)) = X. Suppose also that the intruder has the capability of performing both
encryption and decryption. Suppose that a goal state s0 is given in which the intruder knows a term m, and the NPA
tells us that one of the states that can immediately precede it (obtained by backwards narrowing) is one, s0.0, in which
the intruder knows K and e(K,m). Since the intruder uses K and e(K,m) at the present state s0.0 to produce m in the
following state s0, we say that it actually learns m in this concrete protocol transition from state s0.0 to state s0, which
implies that he cannot know m in s0.0 or any state preceding it (recall that each term is learned only once). Suppose
that the NPA ﬁnds another state, s0.0.0, immediately preceding s0.0 in which the intruder knows K and m. This state
is therefore unreachable, since the intruder will not learn m until state s0, and, as we said, cannot know it in the present
state s0.0.0. Thus s0.0.0 can be dropped. Fig. 1 depicts the three generated states.
The other technique, one of the most powerful that the NPA uses for state space reduction, is the inductive generation
of co-invariants. The idea, described in detail in [20], is to inductively generate grammars describing formal tree
languages. A user starts by giving the NPA a term (with variables) that he/she believes that the intruder cannot learn.
This term is called a seed term (or seed grammar). The NPA then generates a language containing the seed term such
that, if the intruder learns a member of the language, then it must know a member of the language in a preceding state
of the protocol execution, thus inductively proving the entire language unreachable. The NPA does this by starting out
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Fig. 1. Backwards protocol state exploration for Example 1.
Fig. 2. Backwards protocol state exploration for Example 2.
with a language containing a single grammar production, which describes the seed term. It then generates a set of terms
that the intruder must know in preceding states in order to be able to produce the seed term in the present state, and
uses such a set of terms to construct new grammar productions. Every time the grammar changes, it tests all production
rules to see if the co-invariant is still valid, i.e., to see that the knowledge of the terms described by such productions
requires previous knowledge of a term described by the same productions. Wherever it fails to do so it generates new
productions such that this is therefore the case, and retests again all productions in the same fashion. It continues in
this way, generating new production rules and testing them, until it reaches a ﬁxpoint. 2
Example 2. Consider a protocol that uses the same operators as Example 1, with the same properties. Suppose that
each time an honest principal A receives a message X, it outputs d(k,X), where k is a constant standing for a key shared
by all honest principals. We can denote this by a protocol rule X → d(k,X). In order to keep the example simple, we
assume in this case that the intruder does not perform operations itself, but can only intercept and redirect messages
that are sent. Suppose now that we want to ﬁnd out how an intruder can learn a term m that it does not know initially.
The NPA uses backwards search, so we ask what rules could produce m, and how. According to the honest principal
rule X → d(k,X) and the property d(K, e(K,X)) = X, we have that the intruder can learn m only if it previously
knows e(k,m). That is, we consider the rule application e(k,m) → d(k, e(k,m)), where d(k, e(k,m)) =E m. We
then ask the NPA how the intruder can learn e(k,m), and we ﬁnd that it can only happen if the intruder previously
knows e(k, e(k,m)). Fig. 2 depicts the three generated states. We see a pattern emerging, which suggests the set of
terms belonging to the following formal tree language L:
L → m,
L → e(k, L).
We now want to verify the co-invariant stating that intruder knowledge of any member ofL implies previous knowledge
of some member of L. We do this by running the NPA on the term t of each grammar production rule L → t . First
we run the NPA on the term m, and verify that it requires intruder knowledge of e(k,m) in a preceding state of the
protocol, which is a member ofL. We then run the NPA on the term e(k, L), and verify that it requires previous intruder
knowledge of e(k, e(k, L)), which is also a member of L provided the fact that L is a member of L.
It is also possible to combine language generation with the learn-only-once restriction. For example, suppose that
in our search for a term X, we encounter a previous state in which the intruder knows e(K,X). If we try to generate
2 For some seed terms this grammar generation process may fail (that is, might never terminate adding always new productions, or fails to add a
new production, in which case it terminates but with failure). In such cases no grammar generation ﬁxpoint is reached for the chosen seed term, and
no grammar is generated. This means that the chosen seed term cannot be used to cut down the search space, but it does not necessarily mean that
the intruder is able to ﬁnd the seed term.
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a language using the seed term e(K,X), the results will not be very interesting, since the intruder can always learn
e(K,X) if it knows K and X. However, suppose that instead of specifying what the intruder knows we add the restriction
that the intruder does not yet know X; which will be denoted in the paper by the expression X /∈ I. Then we can use
the seed term to characterize the terms of the form e(K,X) that the intruder can observe and use to learn X.
The NPA has a number of other features that it uses to limit the search space, including restrictions on the times at
which the intruder can learn nonces (not before they are generated), and also a form of partial order reduction [29].
However, in this paper we concentrate on the learns-only-once restriction and language generation, since these are the
main tools used in reducing from an inﬁnite to a ﬁnite search space.
3. Preliminaries
This section deﬁnes the terms and concepts from rewriting theory that are used in this paper. Readers already
well-versed in these topics might want to skip this section.
We assume some familiarity with term rewriting and narrowing, see [31,24] for missing deﬁnitions. In this paper,
syntactical equality between elements, resp. inequality, is denoted by e ≡ e′, resp. e /≡ e′.
Given a binary relation ⇒⊆ T × T on a set T of elements (e.g., →R⊆ T(X ) × T(X )), we say that an element
a ∈ T is ⇒-irreducible (or is a normal form w.r.t. ⇒ or is a ﬁxpoint of ⇒) if there is no element b ∈ T such that a ⇒ b.
We denote the transitive closure of ⇒ by ⇒+, and the transitive and reﬂexive closure by ⇒∗. Also, a ⇒! b denotes
that a ⇒∗ b and that b is ⇒-irreducible. We say that the relation ⇒ is terminating if there is no inﬁnite sequence
a1 ⇒ a2 ⇒ · · · ⇒ · · ·. We say that ⇒ is conﬂuent if whenever a ⇒∗ b and a ⇒∗ c, there exists an element d such
that b ⇒∗ d and c ⇒∗ d .
An order-sorted signature  is deﬁned by a set of sorts S, a partial order relation of subsort inclusion  on S, and
an (S∗ × S)-indexed family of {w,s}(w,s)∈S∗×S operations. We denote f ∈ w,s by f : w → s. In this paper, we use
letters in sans-serif font s, s’, . . . to denote sorts, and lowercase letters f, g, h, . . . to denote symbols in . We deﬁne
a relation 	 on S as the smallest equivalence relation generated by the subsort inclusion relation  . We assume that
each equivalence class of sorts contains a top sort that is a supersort of every other sort in the class. Formally, for each
sort s we assume that there is a sort 3 [s] such that s 	 s’ implies s’[s]. Furthermore, for each f : s1 × · · · × sn → s
we assume that there is also an f : [s1] × · · · × [sn] → [s]. We require the signature  to be sensible, i.e., whenever
we have f : w → s and f : w’ → s’ with w,w’ of equal length, then w 	 w’ implies s 	 s’.
A -algebra is deﬁned by an S-indexed family of sets A = {As}s∈S such that ss’ implies As ⊆ As’, and for each
function f : w → s with w = s1 × · · · × sn a function fAw,s : As1 × · · · × Asn → As. Further, we require that
subsort overloaded operations agree, i.e., for each f : w → s and (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Aw we require fAw,s(a1, . . . , an) =
fA[w],[s](a1, . . . , an), where if w = s1 × · · · × sn, then [w] = [s1] × · · · × [sn]. We assume a family X = {Xs}s∈S
of inﬁnite sets of variables such that s /≡ s’ implies Xs ∩ Xs’ = ∅, and the variables in X are different from constant
symbols in . We use uppercase letters X, Y,W, . . . to denote variables in X . We denote the set of ground -terms
and -terms of sort s by Ts and T(X )s, respectively. More generally, we write T for the -algebra of ground terms
over , and T(X ) for the -algebra of terms with variables from the set X . In this paper, we use lowercase letters
t, s, u, v,w, . . . to denote terms in T(X ). Var(t) denotes the set of variables in t ∈ T(X ) and Vars(t) denotes the
set of variables of sort s. A non-variable term is simply a term that is not a variable.
We use a ﬁnite sequence of positive integers, called a position, to denote an access path in a term. For t ∈ T(X ),
Pos(t) denotes the set of positions in t, and Pos(t) denotes the set of non-variable positions in t. Given a position p
and a set P of positions, we deﬁne p.P = {p.q | q ∈ P }. Given two positions p, q, we denote p.{q} also as p.q. The
root of a term is at the empty position . The subterm of t at position p is denoted by t |p and t[s]p is the term t with
the subterm at position p replaced by s.
A substitution is a mapping  : X → T(X ) which maps a variable of sort s to a term of sort s’ such that s’s, and
which is different from the identity only for a ﬁnite subsetDom() ofX . A substitutionwithDom() = {X1, . . . , Xn}
is usually denoted as  = [X1/t1, . . . , Xn/tn]. The identity substitution is denoted by id, i.e., Dom(id) = ∅. We
denote the homomorphic extension of  to T(X ) also by . The set of variables introduced by  is Ran() =⋃
X∈Dom() Var((X)). The restriction of a substitution  to a set of variables V is deﬁned as ↓V (X) = (X) if
3 In the order-sorted speciﬁcations discussed in this paper we will sometimes leave this top sort and its associated operators implicit, in the sense
that an order-sorted signature can always be conservatively completed to one satisfying our requirements.
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X ∈ V ; and ↓V (X) = X otherwise. We say that a substitution  is away from a set of variablesV ifRan()∩V = ∅.
For substitutions ,  such thatDom()∩Dom() = ∅ we deﬁne their composition as ( ◦)(X) = ((X)) for each
variable X ∈ X .
Given a binary relation ⇒⊆ T(X ) × T(X ), we say that a term t is strongly ⇒-irreducible if for any substitution
 such that for each x ∈ Dom(), (x) is ⇒-irreducible, then (t) is ⇒-irreducible.
A -equation is an expression of the form t = t ′, where t, t ′ ∈ T(X )s for an appropriate sort s. Order-sorted
equational logic has a sound and complete inference system E  [25] inducing a congruence relation =E on terms
t, t ′ ∈ T(X ): t =E t ′ if and only if E  t = t ′; where under the assumption that all sorts S in  are non-empty,
i.e., ∀s ∈ S : Ts = ∅, the inference system E  can treat universal quantiﬁcation in an implicit way.
TheE-subsumptionpreorderE holds between t, t ′ ∈ T(X ), denoted t E t ′ (meaning that t ′ ismore general than t),
if there is a substitution  such that t =E (t ′); such a substitution  is said to be an E-match from t to t ′. We write
t  t ′ when E is empty, i.e., t ∅ t ′. We extend this to substitutions as follows: E ′ iff there is a substitution  such
that  =E ′ ◦ .
An E-uniﬁer for a -equation t = t ′ is a substitution  such that (t) =E (t ′). For Var(t)∪ Var(t ′) ⊆ W , a set of
substitutions CSUE(t = t ′,W) is said to be a complete set of uniﬁers of the equation t =E t ′ away from W if: (i) each
 ∈ CSUE(t = t ′,W) is an E-uniﬁer of t =E t ′; (ii) for any E-uniﬁer  of t =E t ′ there is a  ∈ CSUE(t = t ′,W)
such that ↓V E ↓V and V = Var(t) ∪ Var(t ′); (iii) for all  ∈ CSUE(t = t ′,W), Dom() ⊆ Var(t) ∪ Var(t ′)
and Ran() ∩W = ∅. An E-uniﬁcation algorithm is complete if for any equation t = t ′ it generates a complete set of
E-uniﬁers. Note that this set needs not be ﬁnite. A uniﬁcation algorithm is said to be ﬁnitary and complete if it always
terminates after generating a ﬁnite and complete set of solutions. We denote the uniﬁcation problem CSU∅(t = t ′,W),
which has a unique uniﬁer, simply as the substitution mgu(t, t ′).
A rewrite rule is an expression of the form l → r , where l, r ∈ T(X )s for an appropriate sort s. In this paper,
we do not impose the usual condition Var(r) ⊆ Var(l). An (unconditional) Porder-sorted rewrite theory is a triple
R = (,, E,R) with  an order-sorted signature, E a set of -equations, R a set of rewrite rules, and where
 :  → P(N) speciﬁes the frozen arguments (f ) ⊆ {1, . . . , ar(f )} of each f ∈ . We say that a position p in t is
-frozen (or frozen if  is obvious) if ∃q < p such that p = q.i.q ′ and i ∈ (root(t |q)). Note that completeness of the
different rewriting and narrowing relations introduced in what follows is always subject to the frozenness requirements
imposed by . A topmost rewrite theory is a rewrite theory where rewriting and narrowing steps can only occur at the
top of terms. This can occur, for instance, because the sort information and the rules force such rewrites to happen only
at the top of terms, or because the frozenness speciﬁcation  always blocks rewrites at any proper subterm positions.
We deﬁne the one-step rewrite relation →,R on T(X ) as follows: t p→,R t ′ (or p→R if  is not relevant, or
→R if p is not relevant) if there is a non--frozen position p ∈ Pos(t), a (possibly renamed) rule l → r in R such
that Var(t) ∩ (Var(r) \ Var(l)) = ∅, and a substitution  such that t |p = (l) and t ′ = t[(r)]p. We say that R is
terminating (conﬂuent) if the relation →R is terminating (conﬂuent). And we say R is convergent if it is terminating
and conﬂuent. The one-step R,E-rewrite relation 4 on T(X ) is deﬁned as follows: t p→,R,E t ′ (or p→R,E if  is
not relevant, or →R,E if p is not relevant) if there is a non--frozen position p ∈ Pos(t), a (possibly renamed) rule
l → r in R such that Var(t) ∩ (Var(r) \ Var(l)) = ∅, and a substitution  such that t |p =E (l) and t ′ = t[(r)]p.
We deﬁne the one-step narrowing relation on T(X ) as follows: t p,,R t ′ (or p,R if  is not relevant, or,R
if p is not relevant, orR if  is not relevant) if there is a non--frozen position p ∈ Pos(t), a (possibly renamed) rule
l → r in R such that Var(t)∩ (Var(l)∪Var(r)) = ∅, and a uniﬁer  ≡ mgu(t |p, l) such that t ′ = (t[r]p). The R,E-
narrowing relation on T(X ) is deﬁned as follows, where we assume that there is a complete uniﬁcation algorithm for
E: t p,,R,E t ′ (or p,R,E if is not relevant, or,R,E if p is not relevant, orR,E if  is not relevant) if there is a
non--frozen position p ∈ Pos(t), a (possibly renamed) rule l → r in R such that Var(t)∩ (Var(l)∪Var(r)) = ∅,
and a E-uniﬁer  ∈ CSUE(t |p = l, V ) for Var(t) ∪ Var(l) ∪ Var(r) ⊆ V such that t ′ = (t[r]p).
An important restriction in narrowing is the basic narrowing strategy [15], which performs narrowing steps only
at subterms which have not been introduced by a previous computed substitution, i.e., a subterm that belongs to the
original term. Given a narrowing sequence t0
p11,,R t1
p22,,R · · ·
pnn,,R tn, we inductively deﬁne the basic
4 A stronger alternative is the →R/E relation. However, we can safely restrict ourselves to the weaker →R,E when we have the following
properties, satisﬁed by our inference system: (i) R is a topmost rewrite theory, (ii) the equations in E do not have variables of the top sort of R, and
(iii) E has a complete uniﬁcation algorithm, see [26] for details.
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positions as B0 = Pos(t0) and Bi = (Bi−1 \ pi.Pos(ti−1|pi )) ∪ pi.Pos(ri) where li→ri ∈ R is used at step i.
We deﬁne a basic narrowing sequence s∗B,,,Rt as s0
p11,,R s1 · · · sn−1
pnn,,R sn such that s ≡ s0, t ≡ sn,
 ≡ 1 ◦ · · · ◦ n, and pi ∈ Bi−1 for 1 in.
When the equations in the equational theory E can be viewed as a ﬁnite convergent set of rewrite rules E, then
basic narrowing with Eˆ = E ∪ {x 	 x → True} provides a sound and complete E-uniﬁcation algorithm [1], i.e.,
↓V ∈ CSUE(t = t ′,W) for V = Var(t) ∪ Var(t ′) and V ⊆ W iff t 	 t ′!B,,EˆTrue. Note that in general this does
not provide a ﬁnitary E-uniﬁcation algorithm. However, when the equations in the equational theory E can be viewed
as a ﬁnite convergent set of rewrite rules E where the right-hand side of each rule is either a subterm of the left-hand
side or a ground term, then the basic narrowing relationB,R provides a sound, complete, and ﬁnitary E-uniﬁcation
algorithm [16,9], i.e., ↓V ∈ CSUE(t = t ′,W) for V = Var(t) ∪ Var(t ′) and V ⊆ W iff t 	 t ′!B,,EˆTrue.
In this paper, we only consider equational theories E for protocols that can be converted into a ﬁnite convergent set
of rewrite rules E where the right-hand side of each rule is either a subterm of the left-hand side or a ground term.
We will require some protocol messages (i.e., terms) to be strongly → E-irreducible and therefore we will make that
explicit in the presentation.
4. Protocol notation
The Maude-NPA’s search is based on two parameters: a protocol P , and a grammar sequence G = 〈G1, . . . ,Gn〉.
The protocol P is the one whose security properties we want to check. A grammar G in the sequence G is used by
Maude-NPA to reduce the search space explored by backwards narrowing. In this section we introduce the notation,
i.e., the signature P , that we use to specify protocols, and in Section 6.3 we introduce the notation, i.e., the signature
G , that we use to specify grammars. The concrete grammar notation will not be relevant until Section 6, although we
will introduce brief comments when necessary.
The operators in P and G are generic and apply to many different protocols. They include a special sort Msg
of messages. A concrete protocol will add extra symbols involving the sort Msg in a protocol-speciﬁc signature ,
such that  ⊆ G and  ⊆ P . Special algebraic properties of a protocol may be speciﬁed with symbols in  and
equations in E such that the sort of the terms of the equations must be Msg or smaller, i.e., t, t ′ ∈ T(X )s and sMsg
for each t = t ′ ∈ E. The protocol is speciﬁed by means of a set P of strands [12], which are terms of a speciﬁc form
in the signature P . Our inference system will therefore be parametric on the protocol-speciﬁc syntax, equations, and
strands, i.e., on the triple (, E,P).
Deﬁnition 1 (Protocol signature). Given a protocol P , we use its protocol-speciﬁc signature  to build the general
signature P =  ∪ Strand ∪ I ∪ State, where signature Strand deﬁnes strands, signature I deﬁnes the intruder
knowledge, and signature State deﬁnes a protocol state; both I and State will not be relevant until Section 5.1.
We adopt a notation for specifying a protocol quite close to that of strand spaces [12]. In a strand, a local execution
of a protocol by a principal is indicated by a sequence of messages as shown below, where nodes representing input
messages are assigned a negative sign, and nodes representing output messages are assigned a positive sign
[msg−1 ,msg+2 ,msg−3 , . . . ,msg−k−1,msg+k ].
We write msg± to denote msg+ or msg−. We use strands for backwards reachability analysis by narrowing. For this
we need a mark, the symbol |, to divide past and future, i.e., we consider strands of the form
[msg±1 , . . . ,msg±j−1 | msg±j ,msg±j+1, . . . ,msg±k ],
where msg±1 , . . . ,msg
±




j+1, . . . ,msg
±
k are the future messages (msg±j is the
immediate future message). Note that the mark | can appear in any position in the strand. So, [nil | msg±1 , . . . ,msg±k ]
denotes a strand in its initial state, whereas [msg±1 , . . . ,msg±k | nil] denotes a strand in its ﬁnal state. For simplicity,
[msg±1 , . . . ,msg±k ] will denote the strand [nil | msg±1 , . . . ,msg±k ].
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Deﬁnition 2 (Strand signature). Given a protocol P , we use its protocol-speciﬁc signature  to build the strand
signature 5 Strand =  ∪ { [ _ | _ ], _+, _−, _, _ , _ & _ }. We deﬁne sorts SMsg, SMsgList, Strand, and StrandSet
built on top of sort Msg where the operators are typed as follows:
[_|_] : SMsgList × SMsgList → Strand
_
+ : Msg → SMsg
_
− : Msg → SMsg
and where the operator
_,_ : SMsgList × SMsgList → SMsgList
is a list concatenation operator that is associative and has identity 6 nil, and we assume that there is a subsort relation
SMsg < SMsgList. Moreover, the operator
_ & _ : StrandSet × StrandSet → StrandSet
is a set union operator that is associative, commutative (AC) and has identity ∅, and we assume that there is a subsort
relation Strand < StrandSet.
In this paper, we abuse the notation and write t ∈ w to actually denote that t is a proper subterm of w such that
there exist u, v such that w ≡ u, t, v and _, _ is an appropriate associative (and possibly commutative) operator, i.e.,
w is a term denoting either a set or a list, such as a term of sort StrandSet or SMsgList. Note that, although we use AC
symbols in the protocol signature P , these are not allowed in the protocol-speciﬁc signature .
In security analyses it is often necessary to use fresh unguessable values. For this we use a special sort, called Fresh,
that can be used in the protocol-speciﬁc signature . The meaning of a variable of sort Fresh is that it will never be
instantiated by a computed E-uniﬁer, i.e., for t p,R,E t ′ with l → r ∈ R, we have that VarFresh(t) ∪ VarFresh(l) ∪
VarFresh(r)Dom(); see Appendix A for details. For instance, one can use variables of sort Fresh for nonces in the
strands. This restriction ensures that if nonces are represented using variables of sort Fresh, they will never be merged
and no approximation for nonces is performed. Note that the introduction of new nonces during protocol execution is
ensured by the renaming of rules performed by narrowing, and therefore two strands running different sessions of the
same protocol will have different nonces. For instance, a strand of the form [ e(k,N)+ ] where k is a key shared by all
honest principals and N is a variable of sort Fresh will produce different messages e(k,N1), . . . , e(k,Nk). Moreover,
since variables of sort Fresh can never be bound, a principal can never detect that he/she received data of sort Fresh
that he/she never created. For instance, in the strand [ e(k,N)−, e(k,N)− ], the variable N cannot be of sort Fresh and
it has to be of sort Msg. Note that the framework is very ﬂexible and the user can specify some constant symbols of
sort Fresh to play with nonces that can indeed be merged. Since variables of sort Fresh are treated in a special way, we
will make them explicit in the strands by writing (r1, . . . , rk : Fresh) [msg±1 , . . . ,msg±n ], where r1, . . . , rk are all the
variables of sort Fresh appearing in msg±1 , . . . ,msg±n .
Another important aspect of our inference system is that everything the intruder can learn must be learned through
strands, i.e., the intruder knows nothing in an initial state. However, this is not a limitation, since we can write strands
[ m+ ] for any message m the intruder is able to know at an initial state.
Example 3. The Needham–Schroeder protocol [28] uses public keys to achieve authentication between two parties,
A andB. The protocol involves an initiatorA, a responderB, and a key server S.We use the common notationA ↪→ B : M
to stand for “A sends message M to B”. Encryption/decryption keys are represented by KM , denoting the key of M.
Nonces, i.e., random numbers used as fresh unguessable values in messages, are represented by NX, denoting a nonce
5 In the Maude language [7], operators can be deﬁned using a mix-ﬁx syntax where the symbol ‘_’ denotes each argument position, i.e., ‘_ op _’
denotes the inﬁx representation of a binary symbol op. We use this ﬂexible notation.
6 In this paper, when we say that operator op : s × s → s has an identity operator op′, we implicitly assume an operator declaration op′ : → s,
declaring op′ as a nullary operator of sort s appearing in each signature where the operator declaration op : s × s → s appears.
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created by X. The informal protocol description proceeds as follows:
(1) A ↪→ S : B
A requests B’s public key from S.
(2) S ↪→ A : {KB,B}KS
S sends B’s public key and name to A, signed with its key.
(3) A ↪→ B : {A,NA}KB
A sends a nonce NA, together with its name to B, encrypted with B’s key. B decrypts the message to get A’s name
and nonce.
(4) B ↪→ S : A
B requests A’s public key from S.
(5) S ↪→ B : {KA,A}KS
S sends A’s public key and name to B, signed with its key.
(6) B ↪→ A : {NA,NB}KA
B sends a nonce NB and A’s previous nonce NA to A, encrypted with A’s key. A decrypts the message and checks
whether its previous nonce NA is present or not. If it ﬁnds NA, it assumes that a connection with B has been
established.
(7) A ↪→ B : {NB}KB
A sends NB to B encrypted with B’s key. B decrypts the message and checks whether the decrypted result is NB .
If it is indeed NB , it assumes that a connection with A has been established.
For the formal description of the protocol, we ﬁrst discard all the steps interacting with the server, since the intruder can
ask the server for any public key, and we just assume that the intruder knows all the public keys. That is, we consider
the simpler version of the protocol: 7
(1) A ↪→ B : {A,NA}KB .
(2) B ↪→ A : {NA,NB}KA .
(3) A ↪→ B : {NB}KB .
Then, we make explicit the signature  describing messages, nonces, etc. A nonce NA is denoted by n(A, r), where
r is a variable of sort Fresh. Concatenation of two messages, e.g., NA and NB , is denoted by the operator _;_, e.g.,
n(A, r) ; n(B, r ′). Encryption of a message M with the public key KA of principal A is denoted by pk(A,M), e.g.,
{NB}KB is denoted bypk(B, n(B, r ′)).We assume that all public keys are known by the intruder, so that the intruder can
perform pk(A,m) for any A and a known message m. Encryption with a secret key is denoted by sk(A,M). The secret
key of the intruder is ﬁxed and is denoted by the constant c, so that the only secret key operation the intruder can perform
is sk(c,m) for a known message m. Note that this corresponds to a naïve implementation of RSA; other encryption
systems can be encoded with a different signature, rewrite rules, and equations. The protocol-speciﬁc signature  is as
follows:
pk : Name × Msg → Enc sk : Name × Msg → Enc
c : → Name
n : Name × Fresh → Nonce
_ ; _ : Msg × Msg → Msg
together with the following subsort relations:
Name Nonce Enc < Msg.
In the following we will use letters A,B for variables of sort Name, letters r, r ′ for variables of sort Fresh, letters
M,M1,M2, Z for variables of sortMsg, lettersL,L1, L2 for variables of sort SMsgList, and letters SS, SS′ for variables
of sort StrandSet; whereas letters X, Y will also represent variables, but their sort will depend on the concrete position
in a term. The encryption/decryption cancellation properties are described using the following equations E:
pk(X, sk(X,Z)) = Z,
sk(X, pk(X,Z)) = Z.
7 The entire Needham–Schroeder protocol has been analyzed in the NPA tool [19].
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The two strands P associated to the three protocol steps shown above are:
(s1) (r : Fresh) [pk(B,A; n(A, r))+, pk(A, n(A, r);Z)−, pk(B,Z)+].
This strand represents principal A initiating the protocol by sending his/her name and a nonce, both encrypted
with B’s public key, to B in the ﬁrst message. Then, A receives B’s response and sends a ﬁnal message consisting
of the rest of the message received from B.
(s2) (r ′ : Fresh) [pk(B,A;W)−, pk(A,W ; n(B, r ′))+, pk(B, n(B, r ′))−].
This strand represents principal B receiving A’s ﬁrst message, checking that it is the public key encryption of A’s
name concatenated with some value W, and then sending to A the concatenation of that value W with B’s own
nonce, encrypted with A’s public key. Then, B receives the ﬁnal message from A and veriﬁes that the ﬁnal message
that it receives has B’s nonce encrypted with B’s public key.
The following strands describe the intruder ability to concatenate, deconcatenate, encrypt and decrypt messages ac-
cording to the Dolev–Yao attacker’s capabilities [10]:
• Concatenation of two messages into a message.
(s3) [M−1 ,M−2 , (M1;M2)+].• Extraction of two concatenated messages.
(s4) [(M1;M2)−,M+1 ,M+2 ].• Encryption of a message with a public key.
(s5) [M−, pk(Y,M)+].
• Encryption of a message with the intruder secret key.
(s6) [M−, sk(c,M)+].
Note that we have simpliﬁed the intruder rules w.r.t. [10]. For strand s3, we do not need the extra strand [M−2 ,M−1 ,
(M1;M2)+], since our asynchronousmodel 8 allowsM1 to be generated independently ofM2. Similarly, we do not need
[(M1;M2)−,M+2 ,M+1 ] for strand s4. For strands s5 and s6, we could use the standard Dolev–Yao rules and write
[Y−,M−, pk(Y,M)+] and [Y−,M−, sk(Y,M)+] instead. However, since the intruder knows all public keys but only
his secret key,wemust then add twonewsortsPKey andSKey, add twonewstrands [PA+] and [c+]wherePA is a variable
of sort PKey, and update the operators pk, sk and c as follows: pk : PKey × Msg → Enc, sk : SKey × Msg → Enc,
and c : → SKey. But this is equivalent to writing strand s5, which says that the intruder only has to know M, since the
key Y is already known, and strand s6, which propagates symbol c into the ﬁrst argument of sk.
5. Reachability analysis
The reachability analysis is based on the notion of a protocol state. In Section 5.1, we introduce the notation for
specifying a protocol state and the intruder knowledge associated to each protocol state. In Section 5.2, we present the
reachability analysis from a general point of view and explain which are the possible results of analyzing a protocol.
In Section 5.3, we describe (and justify) the concrete rewrite rules used in the backwards reachability analysis; these
rules are automatically obtained from the strands P . In Section 5.4, we formally deﬁne the reachability analysis as a
backwards narrowing search integrating the grammars as a test to cut down the search space. We prove soundness and
completeness of the reachability analysis in Section 5.5.
As explained in the Introduction, the reachability analysis makes use of grammars to cut down many undesirable and
useless search paths. We postpone until Section 6 the discussion of how grammars are generated and focus, instead,
on how they are used for reachability purposes in this section. For this section, we only need to know that grammars
are produced from a set of seed terms {sd1, . . . , sdn}. For each given seed term sdi , we either succeed in generating a
grammar G!sdi or fail to do so; G
! denotes the ﬁxpoint of the grammar generation process when applied to the grammar
G, and Gsdi denotes the grammar associated to the seed term sdi . The ﬁxpoint of all the seed terms for which we have
obtained a ﬁxpoint are kept in a grammar sequence G = 〈G!sdi1 , . . . ,G
!
sdim
〉, where {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. We also
assume that we can check whether a term t of sort Msg is in the language associated with some grammar G in the
sequence G under the assumption that some constraints C hold. This check is denoted by 〈G, C〉  (t∈L).
8 According to the model of Section 5.3, the acceptance of messageM−1 will add a constraintM1 ∈I to the intruder knowledge and the acceptance
of message M−2 will add another constraint M2 ∈I to the intruder knowledge, and both will be synchronized with different messages M+ and thus
converted into constraints M1 /∈I and M2 /∈I independently of the order in which M1 ∈I and M2 ∈I were introduced into the intruder knowledge.
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5.1. State notation
An important aspect of the reachability analysis is the notion of the intruder knowledge. Sincewe are using backwards
search, we will not have a precise picture of the intruder knowledge set at each protocol state, but we use the convention
that the intruder learns a term only once, i.e., if the intruder does learn a term in the future, then it cannot know it in the
present. Thus, in our backwards search, we keep track of the set of terms that the intruder positively knows or does not
know at some point. In order to represent the knowledge of the intruder, we use a signature I allowing us to specify
positive and negative constraints t ∈ I and t /∈ I stating what the intruder knows or does not know. The exact point in
a protocol run where a term t that was not known, i.e., t /∈ I, becomes known, i.e., t ∈ I, indicates the moment when
the intruder learned t.
Deﬁnition 3 (Intruder signature). We deﬁne the intruder signature I =  ∪ { _∈ I, _ /∈ I, _≈_, _,_ }, the sorts
IntruderCtr and IntruderSet, declare the subsort relation IntruderCtr < IntruderSet, and introduce the operators
_∈ I : Msg → IntruderCtr_ /∈ I : Msg → IntruderCtr_≈_ : Msg × Msg → IntruderCtr
and the operator
_,_ : IntruderSet × IntruderSet → IntruderSet
which is a multiset union operator that is associative, commutative and has identity ∅.
Remark 1. Given a message term t (i.e., a term of sort Msg) and the intruder knowledge IK (i.e., a term of sort
IntruderSet) if two occurrences of the constraint term t ∈ I, or two occurrences of the constraint term t /∈ I, or a
constraint term t ∈ I and a constraint term t /∈ I occur at the same time in the multiset IK, then we can discard such
intruder knowledge as invalid, because of the learn-only-once restriction. Therefore, sort IntruderSet is treated as a set
instead of a multiset.
Another important aspect is how a state is represented. In the NPA tool, complex deﬁnitions of states are possible.
However, in Maude-NPA we simply consider that a state is a set of strands (i.e., a term of sort StrandSet) together with
the knowledge of the intruder in that state (i.e., a term of sort IntruderSet).
Deﬁnition 4 (State signature). We deﬁne the state signature State =  ∪ Strand ∪ I ∪ { {_}, _&_ }, the sorts
StateElm and State, declare subsort relations StateElm < State, and StrandSet < StateElm, introduce an operator
{_} : IntruderSet → StateElm
and extend the associative and commutative operator & with identity ∅ to the State supersort
_&_ : State × State → State.
Remark 2. Given a term SS of sort State, there is only one subterm {IK} in SS where IK is a term of sort IntruderSet
and IK is not invalid as deﬁned in Remark 1.
Example 4. Continuing Example 3. A possible state is (we annotate each strand in the state with the strand identiﬁer
from Example 3 that it comes from):
[ pk(B,A; n(A, r))+, pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′))− | pk(B, n(B, r ′))+ ] & (s1)
[ pk(B,A;Z)−, pk(A,Z; n(B, r ′))+ | pk(B, n(B, r ′))− ] & (s2)
{ pk(B, n(B, r ′)) /∈ I, IK },
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where the message pk(B, n(B, r ′)) will be sent by the initiator (ﬁrst strand) and received by the responder (second
strand). Another possible state is
[ pk(B,A; n(A, r))+ | pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′))−, pk(B, n(B, r ′))+ ] & (s1)
[ pk(B,A;Z)−, pk(A,Z; n(B, r ′))+ | pk(B, n(B, r ′))− ] & (s2)
[ nil | (n(A, r); n(B, r ′))−, pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′))+ ] & (s5)
[ n(A, r)−, n(B, r ′)− | (n(A, r); n(B, r ′))+ ] & (s3)
{ pk(B, n(B, r ′)) /∈ I, pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′)) /∈ I, (n(A, r); n(B, r ′)) /∈ I, IK },
where the intruder is ready to send the message n(A, r); n(B, r ′) (fourth strand) to itself (third strand) in order to be
able to send the message pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′)) later to the initiator (ﬁrst strand).
The following deﬁnition formalizes the notion of an initial state, which is relevant for the rest of the paper.
Deﬁnition 5 (Initial state). A term SS of sort State is initial if every strand in SS is in its initial position, denoted by
[nil | L], and the intruder is not required to know anything, i.e., the intruder knowledge does not contain any constraint
of the form t ∈ I.
5.2. Outline of the general algorithm
The outline of the general search algorithm for ﬂaw detection in the Maude-NPA is as follows.
Input:
(1) The protocol-speciﬁc signature .
(2) The protocol speciﬁcation P described as a set of strands.
(3) A sequence of “seed” terms D = 〈sd1, . . . , sdn〉. These seed terms are indeed grammar productions that deﬁne an
initial grammar to be further extended.
(4) A term SSbad of sort State describing the insecure goal state, i.e., containing some strands required for the protocol
run and any positive and negative facts about the intruder knowledge.
Output: The algorithm tries to deduce whether the protocol is safe for SSbad or not. If the protocol is unsafe, Maude-
NPA terminates with an intruder learning sequence (i.e., the attack trace). If the protocol is safe, the algorithm can often
terminate, thanks to the drastic reduction on the search space given by the grammars, but it may in some cases loop.
This provides a semi-decidable algorithm.
Algorithm: First, build the ﬁxpoint G!sdi of the grammar G
0
sdi









This process may not terminate for some seed terms and may not produce a grammar for some others. The grammar
sequence G contains the ﬁxpoint G!sdi of all those grammars G0sdi for which the grammar generation process suc-
cessfully terminates, i.e., G = 〈G!sdi1 , . . . ,G
!
sdim
〉 where {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and for each j ∈ {i1, . . . , im},
G0sdjP,G0sdj ,s
G1sdj · · ·Gh−1sdj P,Gh−1sdj ,sG
!
sdj
. Second, for the grammar sequence G, check reachability of SSbad using
the backwards reachability relation
〈SSbad, 〉∗,P,G〈SSini, w〉
deﬁned below, where w is the concrete message exchange sequence.
Example 5. Let us consider again the Needham–Schroeder Protocol of Example 3. A ﬁnal attack state pattern to be
given as input to the system can be
[ pk(B,A;Z)−, pk(A,Z; n(B, r ′))+, pk(B, n(B, r ′))− | nil ] &
{ n(B, r ′)∈ I, IK }.
174 S. Escobar et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 162–202
This attack state pattern represents a situation in which B has completed the expected communication with someone
and the intruder has learned B’s nonce. For this insecure goal state, the reachability analysis returns several possible
solutions, for instance the following initial state corresponding to Lowe’s attack [17] (we again annotate each strand in
the state with the strand identiﬁer from Example 3 that it comes from):
[ nil | pk(c,A; n(A, r))+, pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′))−, pk(c, n(B, r ′))+ ] & (s1)
[ nil | pk(c,A; n(A, r))−, (A; n(A, r))+ ] & (s6)
[ nil | (A; n(A, r))−, pk(B, (A; n(A, r))+ ] & (s5)
[ nil | pk(B,A; n(A, r))−, pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′))+, pk(B, n(B, r ′))− ] & (s2)
[ nil | pk(c, n(B, r ′))−, n(B, r ′)+ ] & (s6)
[ nil | n(B, r ′)−, pk(B, n(B, r ′))+ ] & (s5)
{ n(B, r ′) /∈ I, pk(c, n(B, r ′)) /∈ I, pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′)) /∈ I,
pk(c,A; n(A, r)) /∈ I, (A; n(A, r)) /∈ I, pk(B, (A; n(A, r)) /∈ I,
pk(B, n(B, r ′)) /∈ I }.
And the concrete message exchange sequence w that is obtained by the reachability analysis is the following:
pk(c,A; n(A, r))+ . pk(c, A; n(A, r))− . (A; n(A, r))+ . (A; n(A, r))− .
pk(B, (A; n(A, r))+ . pk(B, (A; n(A, r))− . pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′))+ .
pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r ′))− . pk(c, n(B, r ′))+ . pk(c, n(B, r ′))− . n(B, r ′)+ .
n(B, r ′)− . pk(B, n(B, r ′))+ . pk(B, n(B, r ′))−.
This attack [17] corresponds to the following informal message exchange sequence:
(1) A ↪→ I : {A,NA}c.
A sends a nonce NA, together with his/her name to the intruder I, encrypted with I’s key c. I decrypts the message
to get A’s name and nonce.
(2) IA ↪→ B : {A,NA}KB .
I initiates communication with B impersonating A.
(3) B ↪→ A : {NA,NB}KA .
B sends a nonce NB and previous A’s nonce NA to A, encrypted with A’s key. A decrypts the message and checks
whether it ﬁnds the previous nonce NA or not. If A ﬁnds NA, assumes that a connection has been established
with B.
(4) A ↪→ I : {NB}c.
A thinks this is a response from I and responds with B’s nonce. I now can use B’s nonce to impersonate A.
(5) I ↪→ B : {NB}KB .
I completes the protocol with B impersonating A.
5.3. Protocol rules and their execution
To execute a protocol P (described as a set of strands) we associate to P a rewrite theory RP . The protocol rules
RP are obtained from the strands in P in an automatic way. However, we must carefully choose the rules RP in order
to reduce the backwards narrowing search space that they produce. Let us consider a naïve ﬁrst approach. In a forward
or backwards execution of the strands, we would need the following three rules:
R = { [ L | M−, L′ ] & {M ∈ I, IK} → [ L,M− | L′ ] & {IK∈ I}, (1)
[ L | M+, L′ ] & {IK} → [ L,M+ | L′ ] & {IK}, (2)
[ L | M+, L′ ] & {M /∈ I, IK} → [ L,M+ | L′ ] & {IK∈ I} }, (3)
where L,L′, L1, L′1, L2, L′2, L′′2 are variables of sort SMsgList, M is a variable of sort Msg, and IK is a variable of sort
IntruderSet. Rule (1) synchronizes an input message with a message already learned by the intruder, symbolizing that
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the intruder knows such message at that moment. Note that when this rule is applied backwards, it can introduce new
facts t ∈ I by uniﬁcation with an intruder knowledge variable IK. Rule (2) accepts output messages but the intruder
knowledge is not increased, symbolizing that the message has been generated but the intruder does not require such
message for an attack. Rule (3) accepts output messages and the intruder knowledge is positively increased. Again,
this rule can introduce new facts t ∈ I by uniﬁcation with an intruder knowledge variable IK.
In a regular forward execution of the protocol, we start with the strands describing the protocol in the initial state,
e.g., strands (s1) and (s2) of Example 3 for the NSPK example. We then use rules (1)–(3) to move the bars of the
strands to the right until reaching the ﬁnal state. In a backwards execution, we use strands in a ﬁnal state position and
rules (1)–(3) in reverse. However, in an intruder attack we can have many partially executed strands together with many
intruder strands from the Dolev–Yao attacker’s capabilities, i.e., strands (s3)–(s6). Thus, an initial or ﬁnal state in our
tool might involve an unbounded number of strands, which would be unfeasible. To avoid this problem we can use a
more perspicuous set of rewrite rules describing the protocol, where the necessary strands are introduced dynamically.
The key idea is to specialize rule (3) using the different protocol strands.
In a backwards execution, which is the one we are interested in, we add the following specializations of rule (3):
RP = R ∪ {[ l1 | u+, l2 ]& {u /∈ I, IK} → {u∈ I, IK} s.t. [ l1, u+, l2 ] ∈ P}, (4)
where l1, l2 are terms of sort SMsgList, u is a term of sort Msg, and IK is a variable of sort IntruderSet.
Deﬁnition 6 (Protocol rewrite theory). We associate to P a rewrite theory RP = (P ,P , EP , RP ), where RP
contains the protocol rules obtained from the strandsP using rules (1), (2), (3), and (4),EP contains the protocol-speciﬁc
equational theory E plus equations for associativity, commutativity and identity of the _&_ operator, associativity and
identity of the _,_ operator for sort SMsgList and associativity, commutativity and identity of the _,_ operator for sort
IntruderSet; and the frozenness function P is P (_−) = {1}, P (_ ∈ I = {1} , P (f ) = {1, . . . , ar(f )} for f ∈ ,
and P (f ) = ∅ for the remaining. Note that expressions of the form m ∈ I inherit the frozenness restrictions from
the expressions (m− or m+) they are derived from via the rewrite rules RP .
Note that these frozenness restrictions for P imply that input messages, some of the messages stored in the intruder
knowledge, and all the arguments of the messages themselves are assumed to be strongly → E-irreducible. In Example
3, it implies that no input message of the form pk(A,Z)− or sk(A,Z)−, where Z is a variable of sort Msg, can appear
in a strand, e.g., Z could be instantiated to sk(A, Y ) and then pk(A, sk(A, Y ))− is not → E-irreducible. Note also thatRP is deﬁned as a topmost theory, i.e., terms of sort State can be rewritten and narrowed only at the top position using
RP . And note that the rewrite theory RP is used in the Maude-NPA in a backwards way, i.e., we will therefore use the
backwards narrowing relation
R−1P ,EP
where R−1P = {r → l | l → r ∈ RP }.
Example 6. Given the strands of Example 3, the associated strand rules are the following:
• First the ﬁxed rules of R.
(r1) [ L | M−, L′ ] & {M ∈ I, IK} → [ L,M− | L′ ] & {M ∈ I, IK},
(r2) [ L | M+, L′ ] & {IK} → [ L,M+ | L′ ] & {IK},
(r3) [ L | M+, L′ ] & {M /∈ I, IK} → [ L,M+ | L′ ] & {M ∈ I, IK}.
The strands of Example 3 are transformed into the following rules. They model the inclusion of new strands.
• Strand (s1) is transformed into the following two rules:
(r4) [ pk(B,A; n(A, r))+, pk(A, n(A, r);Z)− | pk(B,Z)+ ] &
{ pk(B,Z) /∈ I, IK } → { pk(B,Z)∈ I, IK }.
For instance, this rule describes, when executed in a backwards way, that the intruder learns a term pk(B,Z)
because of a new strand being executed. It represents also the introduction of a new protocol run in parallel,
i.e., a new session.
(r5) [ nil | pk(B,A; n(A, r))+, pk(A, n(A, r);Z)−, pk(B,Z)+ ] &
{ pk(B,A; n(A, r)) /∈ I, IK } → { pk(B,A; n(A, r))∈ I, IK }.
• Strand (s2) is transformed into the following rule:
(r6) [ pk(B,A;Z)− | pk(A,Z; n(B, r))+, pk(B, n(B, r))− ] &
{ pk(A,Z; n(B, r)) /∈ I, IK } → { pk(A,Z; n(B, r))∈ I, IK }.
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• Strand (s3) is transformed into the following rule:
(r7) [ M−1 , M−2 | (M1;M2)+ ] & { (M1;M2) /∈ I, IK } → { (M1;M2)∈ I, IK }.• Strand (s4) is transformed into the following two rules:
(r8) [ (M1;M2)−, M+1 | M+2 ] & { M2 /∈ I, IK } → { M2 ∈ I, IK },
(r9) [ (M1;M2)− | M+1 , M+2 ] & { M1 /∈ I, IK } → { M1 ∈ I, IK }.• Strand (s5) is transformed into the following rule:
(r10) [ M− | pk(Y,M)+ ] & { pk(Y,M) /∈ I, IK } → { pk(Y,M)∈ I, IK }.
• Strand (s6) is transformed into the following rule:
(r11) [ M− | sk(c,M)+ ] & { sk(c,M) /∈ I, IK } → { sk(c,M)∈ I, IK }.
Then, given the following state:
[ pk(B,A; n(A, r))+, pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r))− | pk(B, n(B, r))+ ] &
[ pk(B,A;Z)−, pk(A,Z; n(B, r))+ | pk(B, n(B, r))− ] &
{ pk(B, n(B, r))∈ I }.
Using backwards narrowing modulo EP , we can apply rule r8 and obtain the following state:
[ pk(B,A; n(A, r))+, pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r))− | pk(B, n(B, r))+ ] &
[ pk(B,A;Z)−, pk(A,Z; n(B, r))+ | pk(B, n(B, r))− ] &
[ (M1;pk(B, n(B, r)))−, M+1 | pk(B, n(B, r))+ ] &{ pk(B, n(B, r)) /∈ I },
where the third strand says that themessagepk(B, n(B, r)) received by the second strand is learned (and thus produced)
by the intruder, who obtained such message from another message (M1;pk(B, n(B, r))), that he/she still needs to
resolve.
5.4. The reachability inference system
The key requirement for an inference system that can make use of the grammar generation technique is that it
supports the notion of an intruder who knows some terms in the present and past, and will learn more terms in the future.
The reachability inference system offered by the Maude-NPA meets this requirement.
Before deﬁning the main backwards reachability relationP,G , we must introduce a procedure for the uniﬁcation of
variables in the intruder knowledge, necessary for a correct reachability algorithm, as shown in the following example.
Example 7. Consider a protocol with a unique strand [ t+ ] where t is a ﬁxed message without Fresh variables. And
consider an initial bad state such as {X ∈ I, Y ∈ I } declaring that the intruder is able to learn two pieces of informationX
andY and no strand is provided. If we run the protocol, we expect the initial state [ nil | t+ ]& [ nil | t+ ]& { t /∈ I, t /∈ I }
declaring that the intruder was able to learn the message t twice. However, because of the learn-only-once restriction,
such an initial state is invalid (see Remark 1) and the appropriate initial state is [ nil | t+ ] & { t /∈ I }, computable only
if the variables X and Y are uniﬁed at some point.
Therefore, before applying a backwards narrowing step using the protocol rules, we must check if some variables
in the intruder knowledge can be uniﬁed and in such a case, create two versions of the same state, one where they are
indeed uniﬁed and another one where they are necessarily different, denoted by the intruder constraint X ≈Y given in
Deﬁnition 3.
Deﬁnition 7 (Splitting of intruder knowledge). Given a term SS of sort State, the relation ⇒,splitIK is deﬁned as
follows:
SS & { IK } ⇒id,splitIK SS & { IK, X ≈Y } and
SS & { IK } ⇒,splitIK (SS & { IK′ })
if ∃X, Y ∈ X and  s.t. (X ∈ I) ∈ IK, (Y ∈ I) ∈ IK, (X ≈Y ) /∈ IK,
 = mgu(X, Y ), and IK′ is IK without the term (Y /∈ I).
A sequence S ⇒1,splitIK S1 ⇒n,splitIK · · · ⇒n,splitIK Sk is denoted by S ⇒∗,splitIK Sk where  = 1 ◦ · · · ◦ n.
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Fig. 3. Dependencies between relations and operators in the reachability phase.
Remark 3. Given a term SS of sort State, if we have a constraint of the form t ≈t in the intruder knowledge IK of SS,
then we can discard SS as invalid.
We deﬁne the backwards narrowing reachability relation,P,G .
Deﬁnition 8 (Backwards reachability). Given a term SS of sort State, the backwards reachability relation P,G is
deﬁned by the equivalence
〈SS, w〉 ◦′,P,G 〈SS′′,  ◦ ′(m± . w)〉
iff SS ⇒!,splitIK SS′, SS′ •′,P ,R−1P ,EP SS
′′ and SS′′ is G-safe,
where SS′, SS′′ are also terms of sort State, w is the concrete message exchange sequence described using the list
concatenation operator _._ which is associative and has identity , and m± is the concrete message expression moved
from past to future, i.e., there is a strand [ l | m±, l′ ] in SS′′ such that [ l, m± | l′ ] appeared in SS′ or [ l | m±, l′ ] has
been added to SS′′.
Its auxiliary relations are depicted in Fig. 3. We will write P,G when the concrete computed substitution is not




is deﬁned in Appendix A. And the notion of
G-safe state is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 9 (G-safe protocol state). Given a term SS of sort State and a grammar sequence G, we say that SS is G-safe
if, for IK the intruder knowledge in SS, for each strand [ l | l′ ] ∈ SS, and for each m− in l, the term (m /∈ I) does
not appear in IK and 〈G, ﬁlter/∈(IK)〉   (m∈L), where ﬁlter/∈(IK) returns all the constraints of the form _ /∈ I in IK.
We write G-safe instead of G-safe when we want to emphasize that a single grammar G (possibly not in G) is used.
The intuition behind the notion of a G-safe state is that a state is G-safe if it is not discarded by the learn-only-once
restriction and it is not captured by the grammars G, where by being captured we mean that there is an input message
in a strand of the state that is a member of the language deﬁned by a grammar G in the sequence G.
Recall that messages inside the operators _− and _ /∈ I are frozen, since we assume that they are always strongly
→ E-irreducible.
Although grammars are explained in detail in Section 6, we give the following example of how they are used to cut
the search space for motivational purposes.
Example 8. Continuing Example 6. For the state:
[ pk(B,A; n(A, r))+, pk(A, n(A, r); n(B, r))− | pk(B, n(B, r))+ ] &
[ pk(B,A;Z)−, pk(A,Z; n(B, r))+ | pk(B, n(B, r))− ] &
[ (M1;pk(B, n(B, r)))−, M+1 | pk(B, n(B, r))+ ] &{ pk(B, n(B, r)) /∈ I }
we can use the following grammar G (where X, Y are variables of sort Msg, B is a variable of sort Name, and r is a
variable of sort Fresh):
Y /∈ I, Y  n(B, r) → X;Y∈L
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to conclude that this state is not G-safe, i.e., the input message M1;pk(B, n(B, r)) in the third strand is a member of
the formal tree language of G and so it is unreachable for an intruder. This grammar G describes a formal tree language
containing any concatenation message t1; t2 of two messages t1 and t2, where subterm t2 is positively not known by
the intruder (i.e., t2 /∈ I) and t2 is not a nonce (i.e., t2  n(B, r)).
5.5. Soundness and completeness
Soundness of the reachability algorithm is now clear by the deﬁnition of the backwards narrowing relation∗P,G .
Theorem 1 (Soundness). LetP be a protocol and let SSbad be a ﬁnal attack state pattern. If 〈SSbad, 〉∗,P,G〈SSini, w〉
and SSini is an initial state term, then SSini →∗RP ,EP (SSbad).
To establish completeness of the reachability algorithm, we need an auxiliary result.
Theorem 2 (Topmost strong completeness Meseguer and Thati [26]). LetR = (,, E,R) be a topmost rewrite the-
ory, t, t ′ ∈ T(X ), and let  be a substitution such that (t) →∗R,E t ′. Then, there are substitutions ,  and a term t ′′
such that t∗,R,Et
′′
, (t) ≡ ((t)), and t ′ ≡ (t ′′).
Completeness of the reachability analysis follows from Theorems 2 and 9, which provides soundness of grammars,
i.e., soundness of the G-safe test.
Theorem 3 (Completeness). Let P be a protocol and let G be a set of generated grammars. Let  be a substitution,
SSini be an initial state term, and SSbad be a ﬁnal state term such that (SSini) →∗RP ,EP (SSbad). Then, there are
substitutions ,  and an initial State term SS′ini such that 〈SSbad, 〉 ∗,P,G 〈(SS′ini), w〉, (SSbad) ≡ ((SSbad)),
and (SSini) ≡ ((SS′ini)).
Proof. There are three issues here: (i) the relation ⇒,splitIK, (ii) topmost narrowing using •,P ,R−1P ,EP , and (iii)
the G-safe test. If we have an attack (SSini) →∗RP ,EP (SSbad) for a substitution , there cannot be more than one
occurrence of a constraint t /∈ I in the intruder knowledge of SSini due to the learn-only-once restriction of Remark 1.
If there are some variables in SSbad that uniﬁes, then the relation⇒,splitIK would perform such uniﬁcation of variables.
Otherwise, the relation⇒,splitIK would introduce constraints of the form t ≈s that do not affect the reachability process.
The rewrite theory used in our backwards reachability analysis is not topmost in the strict sense, but given the fact that
it rewrites a ﬂat set modulo associativity, commutativity, and identity, it is ACU-topmost in the sense of [26] and is
therefore semantically equivalent to a topmost theory in the strict sense, so that Theorem 2 applies. This means that the
general backwards search narrowing analysis is complete. It now remains to be shown that completeness is not lost by
using the strategy associated to the grammar sequence G, i.e., the G-safe test. This follows from Theorem 9 in Section
6.6, since the paths removed by the grammars G are paths leading to unreachable states, i.e., states unreachable from
the initial state. 
6. Grammar generation
Now, we focus on how grammars are generated by the Maude-NPA tool. In Section 6.1, we informally explain
how the Maude-NPA tool generates grammars deﬁning formal tree languages. For generating grammars, we do not
need the strand representation of protocols deﬁned in Section 4, so we provide in Section 6.2 an abstraction of the
protocols into rewriting rules. In Section 6.3, we introduce the notation that we use to specify grammars and how they
are transformed into a rewrite theory for membership purposes. In Section 6.4, we deﬁne how membership of a message
into a grammar’s language is performed. In Section 6.5, we formally describe how grammars are generated in terms of
narrowing and rewriting. We provide the dependencies between the different operators used to generate grammars in
Fig. 5. Soundness of the grammars, i.e., that they describe states unreachable for an intruder, is proved in Section 6.6.
We show how the grammar generation process is applied to the Needham–Schroeder example throughout this entire
section.
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6.1. How Maude-NPA generates languages
In this section we describe the Maude-NPA’s language generation strategy in broad outline, using Example 2 as an
illustration. Recall that in Example 2, we had a protocol rule X → d(k,X), an equation property d(K, e(K,X)) = X,
and the (informally described) grammar L ≡ { L → m, L → e(k, L) } arose.
The Maude-NPA starts out with a simple seed term. This seed term deﬁnes an initial language stating only that
the seed term is in the language. In Example 2, this seed term m is represented by the initial grammar {L → m}.
The Maude-NPA strategy for generating languages involves three stages: (i) the term generation stage, (ii) the rule
veriﬁcation stage, and (iii) the rule generation stage.
In the term generation stage, the Maude-NPA takes each term deﬁned by a language production and ﬁnds a complete
set S of paths to the state in which the intruder knows that term, where by “complete” we mean that any path from an
initial state to that term must contain a path from S as a subpath. In Example 2, there is only one path to the seed term m,
namely the path in which the intruder sends e(k,m) to an honest principal.
In the rule veriﬁcation stage, the Maude-NPA examines each path and determines which paths already require the
intruder to knowamember of the language in order to produce the goal, and thus removes those paths fromconsideration.
In the ﬁrst iteration of Example 2, the single generated path only requires that the intruder knows e(k,m) in order to
learn the goal m. At this stage e(k,m) has not yet been deﬁned to be a member of the language, so that path stays in.
In the rule generation stage, the Maude-NPA looks at the remaining paths, and generates a new set of grammar rules
according to a set of heuristics. For instance, one such heuristic says that, if a path contains a term containing a word
in the language as a subterm, then replace that subterm by a variable W and add a condition saying that W is in the
language, to obtain a new grammar rule. In Example 2, this heuristic generates the grammar rule L → e(k, L), where
the non-terminal L can be seen as such a variable W.
After the rule generation stage, the Maude-NPA reiterates the three stages until either all paths are eliminated in the
rule veriﬁcation stage, in which case it has successfully deﬁned a language, or it can deﬁne no new language rules
in the rule generation stage, in which case it has failed to deﬁne a language. It can also conceivably fail to terminate
adding new rules forever.
In Example 2, the Maude-NPA successfully deﬁnes a language. In the second iteration, the Maude-NPA shows that
the sole path generated by each generic term deﬁned by a language rule contains a member of the language. At this
point it terminates with success.
In actual fact, the Maude-NPA interleaves the term generation stage and the rule veriﬁcation stage. And, as we shall
see, both the rule veriﬁcation and rule generation stages can be considerably more complex than for the simple example
given here. However, this example should help the reader understand in broad outline the more detailed ideas that we
present below.
6.2. Simpliﬁed protocol rules and their execution
To facilitate the grammar generation process, we use an abstract version of the protocol rules of Section 5.3. We use
a more abstract and simple description of the protocol rules that extracts from the strands the information of what terms
the intruder must know in order to send a term. This approach is similar to other rule-based or clause-based approaches
[32,4,13] and the multiset rewriting formalism [3]. A detailed comparison is left for future work, since there are many
differences, e.g., we do not really have multisets but sets, and the number of messages is not increasing (non-monotonic
or non-cumulative), etc. The reason is that our abstraction keeps only information on how the intruder is able to produce
a concrete message and thus removes all the unnecessary data about strands and the intruder knowledge. Moreover,
it does not represent the actual intruder knowledge nor the reachability process as in other approaches. Note that the
instantiation restriction for variables of sort Fresh deﬁned in Section 4 does not apply here, and thus nonces can be
merged.
We break each strand up into substrands, with one substrand for each place where a negative node directly precedes
a positive node. We represent the substrand as a protocol rule of the form u1, . . . , un → v, where v, u1, . . . , un are
terms of sort Msg, the u1, . . . , un are all the negative nodes preceding v, and v is a positive node. Thus, the left-hand
side of a protocol rule describes what the intruder must know in order to produce v. If the intruder observes or creates
u1, . . . , un, then can send them to a principal in the appropriate order, and that principal will then produce v, and if the
principal does not receive u1, . . . , un, then will not produce v.
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Deﬁnition 10 (Simpliﬁed protocol rewrite theory). The simpliﬁed protocol rewrite theory is deﬁned as RSP =
(SP ,SP , ESP , RSP ). The signature is deﬁned as SP = G ∪ { _,_ } (G is deﬁned in Section 6.3.1) where
the operator _,_ : MsgSet × MsgSet → MsgSet is a set union operator that is associative, commutative, and has
identity ∅, and we assume that there is a subsort relation Msg < MsgSet. The rewrite rules are deﬁned as





(m, neg(l′)) if l ≡ (m−, l′),
neg(l′) if l ≡ (m+, l′),
∅ if l ≡ nil.
The frozenness function is SP (_→_) = {1} and SP (f ) = G(f ) for the remaining f ∈ G (symbol _ →_ ∈ G
describes a grammar rule and G is the frozenness function for grammars; both are deﬁned in Section 6.3). And the
equational theoryESP is deﬁned as the protocol-speciﬁc equationsE explained in Section 4, together with the equations
for associativity, commutativity and identity of the _,_ operator.
Recall that the frozenness restriction SP (_→_) = {1} implies that the ﬁrst argument of the symbol _ →_ is frozen.




SP = {r → l | l → r ∈ RSP }.
Example 9. Consider the signature  of Example 3. In the rewrite theory RSP = (P ,SP , ESP , RSP ), the rules
RSP are listed below (rules p1–p7):
• Strand (s1) is transformed into the following rules:
(p1) ∅ → pk(B, A; n(A, r)),
(p2) pk(A, n(A, r);Z) → pk(B,Z).
• Strand (s2) is transformed into the following rule:
(p3) pk(B,A;Z) → pk(A,Z; n(B, r)).
Rules p4–p7 describe the intruder abilities according to strands (s3)–(s6):
Strand (s3) is transformed into the following rule:
(p4) M1,M2 → M1;M2.
• Strand (s4) is transformed into the following two rules:
(p5) M1;M2 → M1,
(p6) M1;M2 → M2.
• Strand (s5) is transformed into the following rule:
(p7) M → pk(Y,M).
• Strand (s6) is transformed into the following rule:
(p8) M → sk(c,M).
The following results relate the narrowing relations associated to the two rewrite theoriesRP andRSP of a protocol
P . First, we introduce an auxiliary deﬁnition for relating a protocol state and an abstract protocol state.
Deﬁnition 11 (Abstract protocol representation). We deﬁne a transformation function mset : State → MsgSet from
a term SS of sort State into a term of sort MsgSet as
mset(SS) = {m | (m∈ I) ∈ IK, or (m /∈ I) /∈ IK and ∃[ l | l′ ] ∈ SS s.t. m ∈ neg(l)},
where IK is the intruder knowledge appearing in the term {IK} in SS.
Intuitively, mset(SS) denotes all the messages the intruder has to learn, i.e., input messages m− in the strands in SS
and each message m∈ I in the intruder knowledge IK in SS.
In the following,{0,1},R,E denotes zero or one narrowing steps of the relation,R,E . Note that, since the abstract
form RSP of P can bind variables of sort Fresh (i.e., merge nonces), unlike RP , we can prove only one direction of
the following statement.
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Proposition 1. Given a protocol P , its associated rewrite theory RP = (P ,P , EP , RP ), its associated rewrite










where ′ ≡ ↓Var(mset(SS)).
Proof. By considering each possible protocol rule in RP ; recall that they are applied in a backwards way.
• [ L | M−, L′ ] & {M ∈ I, IK} → [ L,M− | L′ ] & {M ∈ I, IK}.
Immediate, since mset(SS′) ≡ mset(SS), i.e., (M) ∈ neg((L)) ⊆ mset(SS) and (M) ∈ mset(SS′) due to its
inclusion in the intruder knowledge.
• [ L | M+, L′ ] & {IK} → [ L,M+ | L′ ] & {IK}.
Immediate, since mset(SS′) ≡ mset(SS).
• [ L | M+, L′ ] & {M /∈ I, IK} → [ L,M+ | L′ ] & {M ∈ I, IK}.
This rule accepts an output message u in a strand [ l1, u+ | l2 ] in SS′. By deﬁnition, there is a rule u1, . . . , uk → m in
RSP such that (u) =EP (m) and neg(l1) = {(u1), . . . , (uk)}. Therefore, we have mset(SS)•′,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP
mset(SS′) such that ′ = ↓Var(m) and mset(SS′) = (mset(SS) − {(u)}) ∪ {(u1), . . . , (uk)}.
• [ l1 | u+, l2 ]& {u /∈ I, IK} → {u∈ I, IK}.
This rule introduces a new strand [ l1 | u+, l2 ] in SS′, i.e., SS′ = SS ∪ {([ l1 | u+, l2 ])}. By deﬁnition, there
is a rule u1, . . . , uk → m in RSP such that (u) =EP (m) and neg((l1)) = {(u1), . . . , (uk)}. Therefore,
we have mset(SS) •
′,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP
mset(SS′) such that ′ = ↓Var(m) and mset(SS′) = (mset(SS) − {(u)}) ∪
{(u1), . . . , (uk)}. 
And the main theorem relating the narrowing relations associated to RP and RSP is the following one.
Theorem 4 (Correspondence). Given a protocol P , its associated rewrite theory RP = (P ,P , EP , RP ), its





SSini then mset(SS)• !′,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP
∅ where ′ ≡ ↓Var(mset(SS)).





• (n = 0) Immediate, since SS is an initial State term and mset(SS) = ∅.








SSini and  =  ◦ . By Proposition 1, we have that there
is ′ such that mset(SS)• {0,1}
′,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP
mset(SS′) and ′ = ↓Var(mset(SS)). Then, by induction hypothesis, there
is ′ such that mset(SS′)• !
′,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP
∅ and ′ = ↓Var(mset(SS′)), and therefore mset(SS)• !′,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP ∅
where ′ = ′ ◦ ′. 
6.3. Grammar notation and execution
This section introduces our grammar notation and explains how grammars are executed as rewrite theories.
Grammars are described bymeans of three basic kinds of constraints. Tomotivate our notation, we informally explain
how the different constraints are generated.
(1) Seed terms may be described in two different ways, either as terms the intruder is not expected to know, or as the
result of performing operations on terms the intruder does not yet know. An example of the latter case is a term
such as pk(X, Y ), where Y is not in the intruder knowledge. This last fact will be denoted by the constraint Y /∈ I
which is the same notation used for the intruder knowledge in Section 5.1. Therefore, facts of the form (t /∈ I) will
make up our ﬁrst type of constraints.
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(2) Another possibility is that the intruder will be able to learn some instance of the seed term, i.e., the user was wrong
when he/she believed the seed term was unknown to the intruder, and so we shall have to introduce some exceptions
in our deﬁnition of the seed term, e.g., (t1 p1), . . . , (tk pk). Facts (t p) will be our second type of constraint.
(3) Once we have identiﬁed the seed term, we will use it to construct grammar rules stating that a term t is in the
language if some subterm s of t is in the language, e.g., (X;Z) is in L if Z is in L. For example, we start out with
a seed term saying that pk(X, Y ) is in the language if Y is not known by the intruder. Thus we start by trying to
ﬁnd the conditions under which the intruder knows pk(X, Y ). Applying rule p7 in Example 9 (in a backwards
way and modulo encryption/decryption equations in E) gives us that this can be achieved if the intruder knows
sk(Z, pk(X, Y )). The term sk(Z, pk(X, Y )) is not in the language, but we can make it so by introducing a rule
that says that sk(W, T ) is in the language L if T is. This motivates the use of the third type of constraint, (t∈L).
In what follows we deﬁne grammar rules and constraints more formally. Given a grammar G in the sequence G, a
grammar rule iswritten c1, . . . , ck → (t1, . . . , tn)∈L, with terms t1, . . . , tn of sortMsg and constraints c1, . . . , ck of sort
Ctr. The intuitive idea of a rule c1, . . . , ck → (t1, . . . , tn)∈L is that in order for any of the terms t1, . . . , tn to be in the
language of the grammar G, say 9 L, then the constraints c1, . . . , ck must be satisﬁed, i.e., c1, . . . , ck → (t1, . . . , tn)∈L
is understood as t1∈L ∨ · · · ∨ tn∈L if c1 ∧ · · · ∧ ck .
Deﬁnition 12 (Grammar signature). We deﬁne the sort Ctr, the signature G =  ∪ {_→_} ∪ Ctr where _ →_ :
CtrSet × LCtr → GRule, and the signature Ctr = { _,_ , _∈L , _  _ , _ /∈ I }. Within the sort Ctr we represent the
three kinds of constraints by means of subsorts LCtr DCtr ICtr < Ctr:
(i) constraints of the form (t /∈ I) are constructed with the symbol
(_ /∈ I) : Msg → ICtr,
(ii) constraints of the form (t p) are constructed with the symbol
(_  _) : Msg × Msg → DCtr,
(iii) constraints of the form (t∈L) are constructed with the symbol
(_∈L) : MsgSet → LCtr.
The operator _,_ : CtrSet×CtrSet → CtrSet is a set union operator that is associative, commutative, and has identity
∅, and we assume that there is a subsort relation Ctr < CtrSet.
Remark 4. We assume that the pattern p in a constraint t p always has fresh variables and therefore no substitution
computed by our inference system can bind pattern p in a constraint t p.
Example 10. Consider the simpliﬁed protocol rules of Example 9. We generate all the intermediate and ﬁnal gram-













represent the ﬁxpoint of each G0sdi and each grammar rule is marked with a number gi.j ,
since they will be used in the rest of the paper.
Informally speaking, (g1.1) implies that any expression of the form pk(B,W) is in the language L associated to the
grammar G!sd1 if the subterm at the position of the variable W is also in the language L, i.e., pk(B,W)∈L if W∈L.
Similarly, (g1.5) implies that a term of the form X;Y is in L if the subterm at the position of Y is not in the intruder
knowledge and is not of the form n(B, r).
6.3.1. Grammar execution
To perform membership of a term in the language deﬁned by a grammar, we associate to a grammar G a rewrite
theory RG.
Deﬁnition 13 (Grammar rewrite theory). Given a grammarG, we associate a rewrite theoryRG = (G,G, EG, RG),
whereRG = {C → C′ | (C → C′) ∈ G},EG contains the protocol-speciﬁc equations E plus equations for associativity,
9 We should write t ∈ LG to denote that t is in the language of the grammar G. Since we always make explicit the grammar G that it is being
used, we can simply write t∈L.
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Fig. 4. All the grammars obtained for the Needham–Schroeder example.
commutativity and identity of the _,_ operator, and the frozenness function G is G(_→_) = {2}, G(_,_) =
G(_∈L) = G(_  _) = G(_ /∈ I) = ∅, and G(f ) = {1, . . . , ar(f )} for the remaining f ∈ .
Note that the restrictions for  allow rewriting or narrowing steps only at the top of terms of sort Msg, which also
implies that every term of sort Msg is strongly → E-irreducible. Note also that RG is a topmost theory.
Recall that, since SP (_→_) = {1} and G(_→_) = {2}, a term
c1, . . . , ck → (t1, . . . , tn)∈L
has the ﬁrst argument frozen when it is rewritten or narrowed using the abstract protocol rules RSP , but it has instead
the second argument frozen when it is rewritten or narrowed using the rules RG of a grammar G. Of course, the rules
RSP and RG will be used in different contexts and for different purposes as explained later. Furthermore, note that
in the Maude-NPA RG is used in a backwards way, i.e., we will consider the relation →G ,R−1G ,EG for a grammar G,




without any risk of non-termination thanks to the shape of the rules in RG,
although the relation is non-conﬂuent and several normal forms must be explored.
6.4. Membership in a grammar’s language: relations 〈G, C〉  (u∈L) and c  c′
Often one needs to check whether a term t is in the language, say L, generated by one grammar G in the sequence G,
i.e., G  (t∈L). More generally, one needs to check whether 〈G,D〉  C, where C is the set of constraints of sort CtrSet
that are being tested for satisfaction, and D is a set of premised conditions of sort CtrSet. This implies performing
a form of backwards rewriting using the rewrite theory RG associated to a grammar G in the sequence G together
with some constraint cancellation between C and the premises D using some disequality reasoning capabilities for
constraints of the form t p.
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Deﬁnition 14 (Constraint order). Given C and D of sort CtrSet, we deﬁne the partial order relation C  D to hold iff
for each ci ∈ C, there is a dj ∈ D such that ci  dj , and where c  c′ is deﬁned on individual constraints as follows
(for u, t, s terms of sort Msg):
(u∈L)  (u∈L),
(u /∈ I)  (u /∈ I),
(u p)  (u p′) if  : u ≡ (p) and pp′,
(u p)  dj for any dj of sort Ctr if  : (u) ≡ (p).
Note that the order  is transitive by the transitivity of .
Deﬁnition 15 (Membership in a grammar’s language). Given C and D of sort CtrSet, we deﬁne




C′) ∧ (C′  D).
We write 〈G, C′〉  C instead of 〈G, C′〉  C when we want to emphasize that a single grammar G (possibly not in G) is
used.
Recall that Var(u) ∩ Var(p) = ∅ for each u p, see Remark 4. In the following examples, we write t →gi.j−1 s
to indicate that t →G ,R−1G ,EG s is rewritten using a grammar rule gi.j in G.
Example 11. Continuing Example 10, we give some examples of membership tests. For the membership test:
〈 G!sd3 , Y∈L 〉  (pk(c, Y );M2)∈L
we have
(pk(c, Y );M2)∈L →g3.4−1 pk(c, Y )∈L →g3.1−1 Y∈L
and since Y∈L is already a premise, we have that (pk(c, Y );M2) is a member of G!sd3 . For the following test:
〈 G!sd3 , ∅ 〉  (A; n(A, r))  (Z′; n(B, r ′))
we have that it does not hold because indeed A; n(A, r)Z′; n(B, r ′). And for the test
〈 G!sd3 , n(B, r) /∈ I 〉 pk(A, n(B, r))∈L
we have
pk(A, n(B, r))∈L →g3.5−1 n(B, r) /∈ I, n(B, r)  n(B ′, r ′), n(B, r) B ′′; n(B ′′, r ′′)
and these constraints are not satisﬁed, since n(B, r) n(B ′, r ′).
The rest of this section studies a different property, called satisﬁability, that we show is related to soundness of
grammars. Informally, satisﬁability of a set C of constraints means that they are still valid under instantiation. However,
this is not true in general because of the constraints of the form t p in C, so we have to restrict satisﬁability of C
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to satisﬁability of another (greater) set D of constraints such that constraints of the form _  _ in D imply constraints
of the form _  _ in C. This is useful when proving that if a word belongs to the grammar of a language under some
constraints C, then any possible instantiation  satisfying C (or a greater set D) makes such word still a member. The
following deﬁnition determines satisﬁability of constraints of the form t p, which can be understood as that there is
still some (future) substitution  that can make true that (t)  p, possibly the identity substitution.
Deﬁnition 16 (  -Satisﬁable constraints). Given a term C of sort CtrSet, we say that C ≡ c1, . . . , ck is  -satisﬁable
if for each ci ≡ (u p), we have that either: (i) i : i (u) ≡ i (p), or (ii) ∃i : i (u) ≡ i (p) and i : u ≡ i (p).
Example 12. The constraint n(A, r)  (Z′; n(B, r ′)) is  -satisﬁable, since the root symbol of both terms is different.
The constraint (A; n(A, r))  (Z′; n(B, r ′)) is not  -satisﬁable, since there is  s.t. (A; n(A, r)) ≡ (Z′; n(B, r ′)).
However, the more generic constraint Y  (Z′; n(B, r ′)) is  -satisﬁable, since there is no  s.t. Y ≡ (Z′; n(B, r ′))
even though there is  s.t. (Y ) ≡ (Z′; n(B, r ′)).
Corollary 1. Given two terms C and D of sort CtrSet if (C  D) and D is  -satisﬁable, then C is  -satisﬁable.
Proof. The only relevant type of constraints is u  t . If (C  D), then for each (u  t) in C, either (i)  : (u) ≡ (t)
and (u  t) is  -satisﬁable independently of D, or (ii) (u  t)  (u  s) for (u  s) in D such that ∃ : (u) ≡ (s)
and  : u ≡ (s), and then, since t  s, ∃′ : ′(u) ≡ ′(t), and ′ : u ≡ ′(t). 
Corollary 2. Given a term C of sort CtrSet and a substitution , if (C) is  -satisﬁable, then C is  -satisﬁable.
Proof. By Corollary 1, since (C)  C for constraints of the form u p due to the restriction Var(p)Dom(). 
The following results prove that membership is closed under substitution, provided some conditions hold.
Lemma 1 (Constraint substitution closure). Given two terms C and D of sort CtrSet and a substitution , if (C  D)
and (D) is  -satisﬁable, then (C)  (D).
Proof. Recall that, by Remark 4, the substitution  cannot bind variables of the pattern p in a constraint t p, and
thus we do not apply  to the pattern p in a constraint t p. By considering each case associated to (C  D):
• In the case “(u∈L)  (u∈L)”, we clearly have that for each , ((u)∈L)  ((u)∈L).
• In the case “(u /∈ I)  (u /∈ I)”, we also have that for each , ((u) /∈ I)  ((u) /∈ I).
• In the case “(u  t)  (u  s) if  : u ≡ (t) and t  s”, we have that  : (u) ≡ (t), since t  s and (u)  s is
 -satisﬁable (i.e.,  : (u) ≡ (s)).
• In the case “(u  t)  dj for any dj of sort Ctr if  : (u) ≡ (t)”, we also have that for each , ((u)  t)  dj ,
since  : ((u)) ≡ (t). 
Theorem 5 (Membership substitution closure). Given a grammar G and two terms C and D of sort CtrSet,
if 〈G,D〉  C, then for each substitution  such that (D) is  -satisﬁable, we have 〈G, (D)〉  (C).









since no extra variables are introduced by the rewriting relation →G ,R−1G ,EG except those in patterns of constraints of
the form t p, but they are not bound by  by deﬁnition. Finally, by Lemma 1, (C′)  (D). 
The following result proves that membership is implied by a greater set of premises.
Theorem 6 (Membership implication). Given a grammar G and three terms C, D and D′ of sort CtrSet, if 〈G,D〉  C
and D  D′, then 〈G,D′〉  C.




C′, and C′  D. Thus, C′  D′. 
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Fig. 5. Dependencies between relations and operators in the grammar generation phase.
6.5. The grammar generation inference system
In this section, we formally describe how grammars are generated. To motivate the procedure, we brieﬂy rephrase
the informal description of how the Maude-NPA generates languages given at Section 6.1, but using the notation and
operators formally described below and using Example 2 and the Needham–Schroeder Example. We depict in Fig. 5
the dependencies between the different operators.
The Maude-NPA starts the grammar generation process with a seed term sdi . This seed term deﬁnes an initial
grammar G0sdi stating that the seed term is in the language, i.e., the user believes it is unreachable for the intruder.
Deﬁnition 17 (Seed term). A seed term, i.e., the ﬁrst grammar rule provided as the seed of a grammar to be generated,
is either of the form t |q /∈ I → t∈L where t |q is a variable of t, or of the form ∅ → t∈L.
Example 13. In Example 2, the unique seed term sd1 is represented by the initial grammar G0sd1 ≡ ∅ → m∈L,
denoting that the intruder cannot learn the message m.
Example 14. For the Needham–Schroeder Example, the seed terms are the grammars G0sd1 ≡ Y /∈ I → (X;Y )∈L,
G0sd2 ≡ X /∈ I → (X;Y )∈L, G0sd3 ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L, and G0sd4 ≡ Z /∈ I → sk(A,Z)∈L, all shown in Fig.
4. For instance, the initial grammar G0sd1 denotes all the terms (t1; t2) such that we know that t2 is not known by the
intruder at the current state in a protocol run.




whereGk+1j is the new grammar generated fromG
k
j . The ﬁxpoint ofG
0
sdi
w.r.t. the operatorGkjP,Gkj ,sG
k+1
j is denoted
byG!sdi . An attempt to transform a grammarG
k
sdi
that is not in its ﬁxpoint form is performed, resulting in a new grammar
Gk+1sdi or failing to produce a new grammar rule, which implies discarding such grammar G
k
sdi
. The ﬁxpoint of all the




{i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Note that the word s in the operator GkjP,Gkj ,sG
k+1
j is a global strategy parameter that
can be instantiated to either S1 or S2 and that determines how new grammar rules are generated; see Section 6.5.6
for details. This strategy parameter is ﬁxed during the whole generation of a grammar. All the generated grammars,
i.e., seed terms, intermediate grammars, and the ﬁxpoint grammars, are characterized as follows.
Deﬁnition 18 (General grammar rule shape). A grammar rule g of a grammar G is always of one of the following
forms:
(positive) t  s1, . . . , t  sn → t∈L (n0),
S. Escobar et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 162–202 187
(negative-S1) t |q /∈ I, t |q  s1, . . . , t |q  sn → t∈L (t |q∈X , n0),
(negative-S2) t |q /∈ I, t  s1, . . . , t  sn → t∈L (t |q∈X , n0),
(recursive) t |q∈L → t∈L (t |q∈X ).
Intuitively, we can have the following grammar productions:
Positive: Messages in the language of the grammar that do not need extra requirements about negative information
of the intruder knowledge, such as ∅ → m∈L of Example 13. They originated as a seed term.
Negative: Messages in the language of the grammar that require negative information of the intruder knowledge,
such as Y /∈ I → (X;Y )∈L of Fig. 4. They originated also as a seed term.
Constrained: Messages of the positive and negative previous forms but that include some syntactic restriction on the
message, where:
• (Positive) For messages of the positive form, only restrictions of the form (t  s) are included, such as
pk(A,Z) pk(A′, n(B, r)) → pk(A,Z)∈L. They are generated only by applications of the generation
strategy S2.
• (Negative) Formessages of the negative form, restrictions of either the form (t |p  s) or the form (t  s) are included.
◦ (Negative-S1)For strategyS1, constraints (t |p  s) are included, such asZ /∈ I, Z  n(B, r) → pk(A,Z)∈L.
◦ (Negative-S2) For strategy S2, constraints (t  s) are included, such as Z/∈Ipk(A,Z)pk(A′, n(B, r))
→ pk(A,Z) ∈ L.
Recursive: Messages that involve a recursive membership call within the grammar, such as Z∈L → pk(B,Z)∈L
of Fig. 4.
Example 15. For the Needham–Schroeder Example, all the grammars shown in Fig. 4 are characterized as described
by Deﬁnition 18.
The transformation of a grammar Gkj into G
k+1




j , is performed in two steps. First, we obtain
the ﬁxpoint of the operator
〈C,H,G〉 ⇒P,Gkj ,s 〈C
′,H′,G′〉
which starts with 〈∅,∅,Gkj 〉 and ends with 〈C′′,H′′,∅〉, where C′′ is a set of constraints of the form t p and H′′ is a
set of grammar rules. Note that if C′′ ≡ ∅ and H′′ ≡ ∅, then we say that grammar Gkj has reached its ﬁxpoint. But if
〈C,H,G〉 is a normal form w.r.t. the relation ⇒P,Gkj ,s and G = ∅, then we say that grammar G
k
j failed and is removed.
Example 16. For the Needham–Schroeder Example and the grammar G0sd3 of Fig. 4, containing only the grammar
rule Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L, we have the transformation step 〈∅,∅,G0sd3〉 ⇒P,G0sd3 ,S1 〈C,H,∅〉 where
C = { Z A; n(A, r), Z Z′; n(A, r) }
and
H = {Z∈L → pk(c, Z)∈L,




Z /∈ I → pk(A, n(A, r);Z)∈L}.
The generation of constraints C and rules H is explained in the following.
Second, we use the operator
newGrammars(Gkj , C′′,H′′)
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to combine these sets C′′ andH′′ with the previous grammar Gkj to produce a preliminary version of Gk+1j and optimize
this preliminary version of Gk+1j using the operator optimize(G), which removes redundant constraints of the form
t p and redundant grammar rules.
Example 17. Continuing Example 16. The combination of C and H into G0sd3 , i.e., newGrammarS1(G0sd3 , C,H),
provides the following grammar:
Z∈L → pk(c, Z)∈L,
Z∈L → pk(A, n(A, r); sk(B,Z))∈L,
Z∈L → sk(A,Z)∈L,
Z∈L → (X;Z)∈L,
Z∈L → (Z;Y )∈L,
Z /∈ I, Z  (A′; n(A′, r)), Z  (Z′; n(A′′, r ′)) → pk(A,Z)∈L,
Z /∈ I, Z  (A′; n(A′, r ′)), Z  (Z′; n(A′′, r ′′)) → pk(A, n(A, r);Z)∈L
and the optimization of newGrammarS1(G0sd3 , C,H) provides the grammar G1sd3 of Fig. 4.
The operator 〈C,H,G〉 ⇒P,Gkj ,s 〈C
′,H′,G′〉 includes the three stages mentioned before: (i) the term generation
stage, (ii) the rule veriﬁcation stage, and (iii) the rule generation stage.




which takes a grammar rule g and returns a grammar rule g′ representing a preceding state in the protocol. We call g′





which is just a slightly modiﬁed version of,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP (see Appendix A).





provides the following pre-grammar rules w.r.t. the simpliﬁed protocol rules RSP of
Example 9:
Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L •[Z/(A′;n(A′,r))],SP ,R−1SP ,ESP (A
′; n(A′, r)) /∈ I → ∅∈L




Z /∈ I → pk(A′, n(A′, r);Z)∈L




Z /∈ I → pk(A′, n(A′, r); sk(B, pk(A,Z)))∈L
Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L •[Z/(Z′;n(B,r))],SP ,R−1SP ,ESP (Z
′; n(B, r)) /∈ I → pk(B,A;Z′)∈L




Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z);M2∈L




Z /∈ I → M1;pk(A,Z)∈L
Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L •[A/c],SP ,R−1SP ,ESP Z /∈ I → pk(c, Z)∈L




Z /∈ I → pk(c, pk(A,Z))∈L




Z /∈ I → Z∈L




Z /∈ I → sk(A′, pk(A,Z))∈L
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The rule veriﬁcation stage is embedded into the g
,P−1,Gkj
−1g′ relation as a test called G-expandable. That is, the





s1, . . . , sn, and tests several things for each si , for instance whether si /∈ I appears in C or whether
〈G, (C)〉  (si∈L) for each si . In such case, the preceding state represented by s1, . . . , sn is not G-expandable and this
path is discarded. Otherwise, we apply the rule generation stage to this grammar rule (C) → (s1, . . . , sn)∈L.





e(k,m) using the abstract version RSP of the protocol rules. We test that ∅ → e(k,m)∈L is
G0-expandable by checking that 〈G0,∅〉  (e(k,m)∈L) returns false. And then, apply the rule generation stage to
∅ → e(k,m)∈L.
Example 20. Continuing Example 18, the following backwards narrowing steps are not G0sd3 -expandable and are
discarded.




Z /∈ I → Z∈L,
Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L•[A/c],SP ,R−1SP ,ESPZ /∈ I → pk(c, Z)∈L.
The rule generation stage is performed by the operator heuristicsGkj ,s(g, , g
′) = 〈C,H〉, which applies several
heuristics to add either new constraints C of the form t p or new grammar rules H.
Example 21. InExample 2, one of the heuristics generates the grammar ruleY∈L → e(k, Y )∈L from∅ → e(k,m)∈L.
Example 22. ContinuingExample 20, for eachG0sd3 -expandable pre-grammar rule the heuristics generate the following
constraint or new grammar rule, where g ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L:
1 ≡ [Z/(A′; n(A′, r))] g1 ≡ (A′; n(A′, r)) /∈ I → ∅∈L
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, 1, g1) = { Z  (A′; n(A′, r)), ∅ }
2 ≡ id g2 ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A′, n(A′, r);Z)∈L
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, 2, g2) = { ∅, Z /∈ I → pk(A′, n(A′, r);Z)∈L }
3 ≡ id g3 ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A′, n(A′, r); sk(B, pk(A,Z)))∈L
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, 3, g3) = {∅, Y∈L → pk(A′, n(A′, r); sk(B, Y ))∈L}
4 ≡ [Z/(Z′; n(B, r))] g4 ≡ (Z′; n(B, r)) /∈ I → pk(B,A;Z′)∈L
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, 4, g4) = { Z  (Z′; n(B, r)), ∅ }
5 ≡ id g5 ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z);M2∈L
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, 5, g5) = { ∅, Y∈L → Y ;M2∈L }
6 ≡ id g6 ≡ Z /∈ I → M1;pk(A,Z)∈L
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, 6, g6) = { ∅, Y∈L → M1;Y∈L }
7 ≡ id g7 ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(c, pk(A,Z))∈L
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, 7, g7) = { ∅, Y∈L → pk(c, Y )∈L }
8 ≡ id g8 ≡ Z /∈ I → sk(A′, pk(A,Z))∈L
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, 8, g8) = { ∅, Y∈L → sk(A′, Y )∈L }
that are exactly the constraints and new rules shown in Example 16.
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Recall that the entire grammar generation procedure is iterated by the operator ⇒P,Gkj ,s until it reaches a ﬁxpoint.
If the term generation stage (i.e., g
,P−1,Gkj
−1g′) does not produce any new state or the rule veriﬁcation stage (i.e.,
the G-expandable test) cuts all the generated states, then we say that grammar Gkj has reached its ﬁxpoint. Otherwise,
if the heuristics were not able to generate either new constraints or new rules, then the operator ⇒P,Gkj ,s fails and the
grammar Gkj is discarded.
Note that we cannot guarantee at the moment whether the grammar generation process might terminate with success,
terminate with failure, or not terminate. Examples 29 and 30 motivate when the grammar generation process might
terminate with failure or do not terminate. But even if the grammar generation process terminates for each seed term
(with success or failure), we cannot detect whether we have a ﬁnite search space using the protocol rewrite theory RP .
A detailed study of the conditions on the protocol and the seed terms to have a terminating grammar generation process
and a ﬁnite search space is left for future work. However, practical experience shows that the grammar generation
process terminates (with success or failure) for many protocols and for some of them we have a ﬁnite search space.
In the following, we formally deﬁne the relations and operators involved in grammar generation in a top–down
(almost) left-to-right order following Fig. 5.
6.5.1. Generating a new grammar: the relation GkjP,Gkj ,sG
k+1
j
We generate a new grammar Gk+1j from a grammar G
k
j using the main grammar transformation relationP,Gkj ,s .
Deﬁnition 19 (Generating a new grammar). Given a grammar Gkj , the set of strand P , and a generation strategy s,
we generate a new grammar Gk+1j as follows:
GkjP,Gkj ,sG
k+1
j if 〈∅,∅,Gkj 〉 ⇒!P,Gkj ,s 〈C,H,∅〉
Gk+1j = optimize(newGrammars(Gkj , C,H))
and Gk+1j /≡ Gkj .
Recall that 〈C,H,G〉 ⇒P,Gkj ,s 〈C
′,H′,G′〉 produces a set of constraints and grammar rules for Gkj , the operator
newGrammars(Gkj , C,H) combines C and H into Gkj to create a new grammar, and the operator optimize(G) removes
redundant information. The word s is a global strategy parameter that can be instantiated to either S1 or S2 and is only
relevant for the heuristics application, see Section 6.5.6.
Example 23. The global grammar generation process for the Needham–Schroeder Example 3 using the relation
GkjP,Gkj ,sG
k+1
j is as follows, where the grammars used were given in Fig. 4:
G0sd1  P,G0sd1 ,S1
G1sd1  P,G1sd1 ,S1
G!sd1 ,
G0sd2  P,G0sd2 ,S1
G1sd2  P,G1sd2 ,S1
G2sd2  P,G2sd2 ,S1
G3sd2  P,G3sd2 ,S1
G!sd2 ,
G0sd3  P,G0sd3 ,S1
G1sd3  P,G1sd3 ,S1
G!sd3 ,
G0sd4  P,G0sd4 ,S1
G1sd4  P,G1sd4 ,S1
G!sd4 .
6.5.2. Adding new grammar rules: the operator newGrammars(G, C,H)
The intuition behind this operator is that the new grammar rules H can be added to the previous grammar G without
problems, since they extend the language of the grammar, but the constraints C of the form t  s pose a problem, since
they restrict the language of the grammar. Therefore, we must add those constraints C to the rules in G∪H, but only to
those rules without a constraint of the form t∈L, which are the ultimate rules used for testing membership. For adding
these constraints, we must consider the strategy used for generating C and H, i.e., strategy S1 or S2. For strategy S1,
we must add constraints _  _ only to those rules with a constraint of the form Y /∈ I (called negative in Deﬁnition 18),
since strategy S1 uses such kind of rules, and adapt each constraint _  _ to the variableY. For strategy S2, we must add
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constraints _  _ to rules with and without a constraint of the form Y /∈ I but each constraint _  _ must be adapted to
the term in the right-hand side of the grammar rule.
Deﬁnition 20 (Adding new grammar rules). Given a set G of grammar rules, a set C of constraints of the form t  s,
and a set H of grammar rules, the function newGrammars(G, C,H) joins the set of grammar rules in G and the new
rules in H with the constraints C:
newGrammarS1(G, C,H) = 	(G, C) ∪ 	(H, C) ∪ Ĝ ∪ Ĥ,
newGrammarS2(G, C,H) = 
(G, C) ∪ Ĝ ∪ Ĥ.
The operator 	(G, C) adds constraints C to grammar rules in G of the form negative-S1:
	(G, C) = {c1, . . . , ck, 	(C) → t∈L | (c1, . . . , ck → t∈L) ∈ G ∧ ∃!ci, ∃Y ∈ X : ci ≡ (Y /∈ I)},
where the substitution 	 is obtained as follows: C consists of several (possibly renamed) dj1 , . . . , djm of the form
(Wj ′  sj ′) with variables W1, . . . ,Wm and terms s1, . . . , sm. We then deﬁne 	(Wj ′) = Y for j ′ ∈ {1, . . . , m} and 	
is the identity elsewhere.
The operator 
(G, C) adds constraints C to grammar rules in G of the forms positive and negative-S2:

(G, C) = {c1, . . . , ck, 
(C′) → t∈L | (c1, . . . , ck → t∈L) ∈ G ∧ ci,w : ci ≡ (w∈L) ∧ C′
= {c′i ∈ C | c′i ≡ (ui  vi) ∧ t  ui}},
where the substitution 
 is obtained as follows: C′ consists of several (possibly renamed) dj1 , . . . , djm of the form
(uj ′  vj ′)with terms u1, . . . , um, v1, . . . , vm. We deﬁne 
 such that 
(uj ′) ≡ t for j ′ ∈ {1, . . . , m} andDom(
) ⊆
Var(u1) ∪ · · · ∪ Var(um).
Finally, for a set S of grammar rules, we deﬁne the operator Ŝ collecting all the grammar rules in S of the recursive
form:
Ŝ = {(t |q∈L → t∈L) ∈ S | t |q ∈ X }.
Lemma 2 (Grammar shape preservation). The new grammar generated by the operator newGrammars(G, C,H) sat-
isﬁes the shape for grammar rules given in Deﬁnition 18.
Proof. The operator 	(G, C) takes negative-S1 grammar rules, i.e., of the form t |q /∈ I, t |q  s1, . . . , t |q  sn → t∈L,
and adds new constraints of the form t |q  s′ to them. Note that the set C of new constraints contains only constraints
of the form Y  s′ whereY is a variable because strategy S1 has been used. And note that the substitution 	 applied to
the new added constraints C ensures that they share the same variable t |q than the previous constraints in the rule. The
operator 
(G, C) takes positive and negative grammar rules and adds new constraints of the form t  s′ to them. Note
that the subset C′ of the set C of new constraints and the substitution 
 applied to the new added constraints C′ ensure
that they share the same term t than the right-hand side of the grammar rule. The operator Ŝ takes recursive grammar
rules, i.e., t |q∈L → t∈L, without any modiﬁcation. 
Example 24. Consider the following set C of new constraints (represented as a term of sort CtrSet)
C = { Z  (A; n(A, r)), Z  (Z′; n(A, r)) }
and the following set H of new grammar rules
H = {Z∈L → pk(c, Z)∈L,




Z /∈ I → pk(A, n(A, r);Z)∈L}.
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Then, we add the set C of new constraints and the set H of new grammar rules to the grammar G0sd3 of Fig. 4 in order
to produce later the grammar G1sd3 and thus compute
newGrammarS1(G0sd3 , C,H) = 	(G0sd3 , C) ∪ 	(H, C) ∪ Ĝ0sd3 ∪ Ĥ,
where
	(G0sd3 , C) = {Z /∈ I, Z  (A′; n(A′, r)), Z  (Z′; n(A′′, r ′)) → pk(A,Z)∈L}
because we simply look for a rule that includes a constraint of the form Y /∈ I, namely Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L, and add
the (appropriately renamed) constraints C to the left part of the rule. We produce 	(H, C) in a similar way
	(H, C) = {Y /∈ I, Y  (A′; n(A′, r ′)), Y  (Z′; n(A′′, r ′′)) → pk(A, n(A, r);Y )∈L}.
The set Ĝ0sd3 is empty, i.e., Ĝ
0
sd3
= ∅, since there is no rule in G0sd3 with a constraint in the left part of the form (Y∈L).
Finally we collect all the rules in H with a constraint of the form (Y∈L)
Ĥ = {Z∈L → pk(c, Z)∈L,




Thus, we ﬁnally obtain
newGrammarS1(G0sd3 , C,H)
= {Y /∈ I, Y  (A′; n(A′, r ′)), Y  (Z′; n(A′′, r ′′)) → pk(A, n(A, r);Y )∈L
Z /∈ I, Z  (A′; n(A′, r)), Z  (Z′; n(A′′, r ′)) → pk(A,Z)∈L
Z∈L → pk(c, Z)∈L




6.5.3. Optimizing grammars: the operator optimize(G)
The operator optimize(G) removes redundant grammar rules and redundant constraints of the form _  _ as
follows.
Deﬁnition 21 (Optimizing grammars). Given a grammar G, we deﬁne:
optimize(G) = removeRules(removeConstraints(G)),
where removeConstraints(G) = {maximal(C) → (t∈L) | (C → (t∈L)) ∈ G} and, by deﬁnition, maximal(C) ⊆ C
is the subset of constraints c ∈ C that are maximal elements in the partial order . And where removeRules(G) is
deﬁned as follows: we ﬁrst choose a grammar rule (C → (t∈L)) ∈ G; if we have 〈G−{C → (t∈L)}, C〉  (t∈L), then
we remove it from G, in any case we repeat the process until no more grammar rules can be removed (we reach a
ﬁxpoint).
The following result follows in a straightforward way from the deﬁnition.
Lemma 3 (Language preservation). Let G be a grammar, and C,D be two sets of constraints. If 〈G,D〉  C, then
〈optimize(G),D〉  C.
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Example 25. For the grammar newGrammarS1(G0sd3 , C,H) of Example 24, its optimization is
optimize(G) = {Z /∈ I, Z  (Z′; n(B, r ′)) → pk(A, n(A, r);Z)∈L
Z /∈ I, Z  (Z′; n(B, r)) → pk(A,Z)∈L,
Z∈L → pk(c, Z)∈L,




since (Y A′; n(A′, r))  (Y Z′; n(A′′, r ′)). And if we had a rule Y∈L → pk(c, n(A, r); sk(B, Y ))∈L, this would
be removed, since it can be obtained from the other rules.
6.5.4. Generating new grammar rules from a previous grammar rule: the relation 〈C,H,G〉 ⇒P,Gkj ,s 〈C
′,H′,G′′〉
Given a set G of grammar rules, a set C of constraints, and a set H of grammar rules, we deﬁne the transformation
relation⇒P,Gkj ,s on tuples 〈C,H,G〉, that extendsHwith new grammar rules and C with new constraints, all associated
to a grammar rule g ∈ G.
Deﬁnition 22 (Generating new rules and constraints). Given a grammar G to be transformed, a grammar Gkj , a set of
constraints C, a set of grammar rules H, and a generation strategy s, we deﬁne
〈C,H,G ∪ {g}〉 ⇒P,Gkj ,s 〈C ∪ Cg,H ∪ Hg,G〉,
where the set of new constraints is Cg = ⋃{Cgg′ }, the set of new grammar rules is Hg = ⋃{Hgg′ }, and Cgg′
and Hgg′ are deﬁned for each backwards narrowing step g,P−1,Gkj−1g
′ as heuristicsGkj ,s(g, , g
′) = 〈Cgg′ ,
Hgg′ 〉 such that either Cgg′ or Hgg′ are not empty. The,P−1,Gkj−1 relation is deﬁned in the following.
Example 26. For the grammar G0sd3 of Fig. 4, we obtain a set of backwards narrowing steps sd3,P−1,G0sd3
−1g′ from
the only rule sd3 inG0sd3 and apply heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(sd3, , g′) to each one of them.Then, the setsHsd3 =
⋃{Hsd3g′ }
and Csd3 =
⋃{Csd3g′ } are the sets H and C shown in Example 24.




Given a rule g in a grammar Gkj , we consider each backwards narrowing step from g producing what we call a pre-
grammar rule g′ which we will use, together with the heuristics, to generate new grammar rules that will be included
into Gk+1j .
A pre-grammar rule is validated using the grammar Gkj produced up to now.
Deﬁnition 23 (Gkj -expandable pre-grammar rule). A pre-grammar rule g ≡ C → (t1, . . . , tn)∈L is Gkj -expandable
iff
(1) C is  -satisﬁable; and
(2) for each ti , we have that 〈Gkj , C〉   (ti∈L) and ti /∈ I does not occur in C.
Intuitively, a pre-grammar rule is Gkj -expandable if: (i) the current constraints of the form u p are satisﬁable,
(ii) none of the messages are captured by the grammar Gkj , and (iii) none of the messages are discarded by the learn-
only-once restriction. If a pre-grammar rule is Gkj -expandable, we apply the heuristics to generate a new grammar rule
such that it implies that the conditions of the pre-grammar rule are satisﬁed. Otherwise, we discard that pre-grammar
rule.
The backwards narrowing relation producing pre-grammar rules is denoted by the arrow
,P−1,Gkj
−1 , where  is
the computed uniﬁer, P is the set of strands generating the set RP of rules to be used for narrowing modulo EP , and
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Gkj is used to further narrow the grammar rule and for G
k
j -expandable test. Recall that rules are always renamed to
avoid variable name clashes.
Deﬁnition 24 (Generating a pre-grammar rule). Given a grammar rule g, the set of strands P , and a grammar Gkj ,
the relation
,P−1,Gkj














g′′ and g′′ is Gkj -expandable.




used in the Maude-NPA is slightly more restrictive than the ordinary
narrowing relation,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP (see Appendix A for details).
Recall from Sections 6.2 and 6.3 that the symbol _ →_ has its ﬁrst argument frozen in RSP , whereas it has instead its
second argument frozen in RG, i.e., given a grammar rule c1, . . . , ck → (t1, . . . , tn)∈L, the relation•,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP
narrows only the right part, whereas the relation 10 →G ,R−1
Gk
j
,EG rewrites only the left part.
Example 27. Consider the following backwards narrowing steps. For the grammarG0sd3 of Fig. 4,we have the following
backwards narrowing step using the protocol rule (p2) ≡ pk(A, n(A, r);Z′) → pk(B,Z′):




Z /∈ I → pk(A′, n(A′, r); sk(B, pk(A,Z)))∈L,
where Z /∈ I → pk(A′, n(A′, r); sk(B, pk(A,Z)))∈L is a G0sd3 -expandable grammar rule and we have solved the
equational uniﬁcation problem pk(B,Z′) =ESP pk(A,Z) using the uniﬁer id and the equation sk(Y, pk(Y, Z)) = Z.
We also have the following backwards narrowing step for G0sd3 using the protocol rule (p7) ≡ M → pk(Y,M):




Z /∈ I → Z∈L
but this step is not G0sd3 -expandable, because term Z appears in a constraint Z /∈ I. For the grammar G1sd3 of Fig. 4,
we have the following backwards narrowing step using (p1) ≡ ∅ → pk(B,A; n(A, r)):
Z /∈ I, Z  (Z′; n(B, r)) → pk(A,Z)∈L
•[Z/(A′;n(A′,r ′))],SP ,R−1SP ,ESP
(A′; n(A′, r ′) /∈ I, (A′; n(A′, r ′)  (Z′; n(B, r))) → ∅
but this step is not G0sd3 -expandable, because (A
′; n(A′, r ′) (Z′; n(B, r)). Again for G1sd3 , we have the following
backwards narrowing step using (p7) ≡ M1;M2 → M1:




Y∈L → pk(c, Y );M2∈L
but this step is not G!sd3 -expandable because the term (pk(c, Y );M2) is captured by G1sd3 , i.e., 〈 G1sd3 , Y∈L 〉
 (pk(c, Y );M2)∈L.
6.5.6. Deciding which grammar rule or restriction to generate from a pre-grammar rule: the operator
heuristicsGkj ,s(g, , g
′)
Here, we use the result of a backwards narrowing step 
,P−1,Gkj
−1 to decide which grammar rule or con-
straint should be generated in order to reﬁne the language L associated to the grammar Gkj . We deﬁne the operator





g′′ in Deﬁnition 24. However, such normalization by narrowing usually does not terminate for the
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heuristicsGkj ,s(g, , g
′) that yields a pair 〈C,H〉, where C is a set of constraints (empty or with one constraint) and H
is a set of new grammar rules (empty or with one rule).
Deﬁnition 25 (Heuristics generating new rules or constraints). The following inference rules deﬁne the four heuris-
tics, where s is a global strategy parameter that can be instantiated to either S1 or S2 (see below), the variable Y is a
fresh new variable, g = C → t∈L, and g′ = D → (s1, . . . , sn)∈L:
H1
∃ si, p ∈ Pos(si) : 〈Gkj ,D〉  (si |p∈L)
heuristicsGkj ,s(g, , g
′) = 〈∅, {Y∈L → si[Y ]p∈L}〉 ,
H2a ∃ u, di ∈ D : di ≡ (u /∈ I) ∧ u /∈ XheuristicsGkj ,s(g, , g
′) = 〈{X  u},∅〉 ,
H2b (t) /≡ t u, di ∈ D : di ≡ (u∈L)heuristicsGkj ,s(g, , g
′) = 〈{t  (t)},∅〉 ,
H3 ∃ di ∈ D, sj , p ∈ Pos(sj ) : di ≡ (sj |p /∈ I)heuristicsGkj ,s(g, , g
′) = 〈∅, {Y /∈ I → sj [Y ]p∈L}〉 .
The intuition behind the heuristics is the following. If we have a grammar G with its associated language L and
we consider one grammar production rule in G, e.g., g = c1, . . . , ck → t∈L, and all of the possible predecessors of
message t w.r.t. the protocols rules RSP , e.g., g′ = D → (s1, . . . , sn)∈L such that t,P−1,Gkj−1s1, . . . , sn, and also
none of s1, . . . , sn is captured by Gkj , then we want G
k
j to be able to capture one of them and thus we try to extend
(or complete) Gkj adding production rules. Heuristics H1 and H3 make an over-approximation and introduce terms in
the grammar that might be reachable for the intruder, whereas heuristics H2a and H2b restrict the grammar:
(H1) This heuristic extends the grammarGkj and, essentially, looks for terms that could be captured byGkj but are not.
For Example 2, ∅ → m∈L is the only rule in grammar G0, we also have that message e(k,m) is learned by the
intruder from message m and since m is a proper subterm of e(k,m), we add a grammar rule Y∈L → e(k, Y )∈L
that captures message e(k,m).
(H2a) This heuristic detects that there is a constraint u /∈ I in the constraintsD of rule g′, where term u is not a variable.
This implies that the intruder can learn some partial data (symbols introduced by uniﬁcation) and thus such
partial data should be excluded from the grammar Gkj .
(H2b) This heuristic detects also that some partial data can be learned by the intruder and also excludes them from the
grammar. The difference between H2a and H2b is explained below.
(H3) This heuristic detects that the intruder has been able to learn a message sj that contains a subterm that appears as
a constraint sj |p /∈ I inD, which implies that it must be unknown by the intruder. Therefore, assuming that sj |p
is unknown by the intruder, we have to include sj in the grammar and thus introduce a rule Y /∈ I → sj [Y ]p∈L.
These heuristics are applied following one of the two possible global strategies for s:
• S1. Apply heuristics in the following order: try H1, if it fails try H2a, if it fails try H3, otherwise stop the whole
grammar generation process for this grammar.
• S2. Like S1, but try H2b instead of H2a.
Note that the choice of S1 or S2 is ﬁxed during the entire generation of a grammar.
The difference between strategies S2 and S1 (i.e., between heuristics H2b and H2a) is that S2 generates more
restricted grammars, thus cutting less terms, than strategy S1. However, strategy S1 can be applied in fewer situations
than strategy S2 because of the _ /∈ I constraint. Therefore, for a seed term of the form ∅ → t∈L only strategy S2
can be applied, whereas for a seed term of the form t |q /∈ I → t∈L it is usually better to start with strategy S2 and
if it fails, try strategy S1. A deeper study of both strategies, reﬁnements, and their automatization is left for future
work.
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Example 28. Consider the grammar G0sd3 of Fig. 4. For the backwards narrowing step using protocol rule (p5)
g ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L
id,P−1,G0sd3
−1 g′ ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z);M2∈L
we can apply heuristic 1 yielding
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, id, g′) = 〈∅, {Y∈L → Y ;M2∈L}〉,
since the subterm pk(A,Z) is already in the language of G0sd3 , i.e., 〈G0sd3 , Z /∈ I〉 pk(A,Z)∈L. For the following
backwards narrowing step using protocol rule (p1)
g ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L[Z/A′;n(A′,r)],P−1,G0sd3−1
g′ ≡ A′; n(A′, r) /∈ I → ∅
we can apply heuristic 2a yielding
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, id, g′) = 〈{Z A; n(A, r)},∅〉,
since we have found a constraint ci ≡ u /∈ I such that u is not a variable. For the backwards narrowing step using
protocol rule (p2)
g ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A,Z)∈L
id,P−1,G0sd3
−1 g′ ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A′, n(A′, r);Z)∈L
we can apply heuristic 3 yielding
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S1
(g, id, g′) = 〈∅, {Y /∈ I → pk(A′, n(A′, r);Y )∈L}〉,
since the subterm Z is already in an original constraint of the form _ /∈ I in g. And for a grammar rule → pk(Y, Z) ∈
LZ /∈ I, where Y and Z are variables of sort Msg, we can consider the following backwards narrowing step using
protocol rule (p2), where B is a variable of sort Name
g ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(Y,Z)∈L[Y/B],P−1,G0sd3−1
g′ ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(A, n(A, r);Z)∈L
and then we can apply heuristic 2b yielding
heuristicsG0sd3 ,S2
(g, id, g′) = 〈{pk(Y,Z) pk(B,Z)},∅〉,
since there is no constraint of the form _∈L and the substitution binds variable Y of pk(Y,Z).
When no heuristic can be applied, the grammar generation process stops with failure for such a seed term, as shown
in the following example.
Example 29. Consider again the Needham–Schroeder Protocol of Example 9 with the following new strand repre-
senting some initial knowledge of the intruder (where A is a variable of sort Name):
(s7) [A+].
This strand is transformed into the following simpliﬁed protocol rule for the grammar generation process
(p9) ∅ → A.
Let us consider a new seed term represented by the initial grammar
G0sd5 ≡ ∅ → A∈L.
This seed term means that the user believes all the principal’s names are unknown for the intruder, which is obviously
false because of the new introduced strand. The grammar generation process fails for this seed term, since no heuristic
can be applied to a pre-grammar rule obtained from the grammar rule in G0sd5 . That is, for the following backwards
narrowing step obtained using the simpliﬁed protocol rules:
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no heuristic of Deﬁnition 25 can be applied for either strategy S1 or S2 because (i) there is no term in the right-hand
side of the pre-grammar rule ∅ → ∅∈L, and therefore heuristics H1 and H3 cannot be applied, and (ii) the substitution
computed during the backwards narrowing step is the identity, and therefore heuristics H2a and H2b cannot be applied
either.
The grammar generation might also not terminate adding new grammar productions, as shown in the following
example.
Example 30. Consider a protocol with a cryptographic system with only two keys k and k′, where only k is shared by
all principals. The following strand deﬁnes the protocol:
(s1) [pk(k′, A;M)−, pk(k′,M)+].
The Dolev–Yao strands are deﬁned as follows, where the intruder can encrypt and decrypt using only the key k:
(s2) [M−1 ,M−2 , (M1;M2)+],
(s3) [(M1;M2)−,M+1 ,M+2 ],
(s4) [M−, pk(k,M)+],
(s5) [M−, sk(k,M)+].
The equational properties are the same as in Example 3. These strands are transformed into the following simpliﬁed
protocol rules for grammar generation:
(p1) pk(k′, A;M) → pk(k′,M),
(p2) M1,M2 → M1;M2,
(p3) M1;M2 → M1,
(p4) M1;M2 → M2,
(p5) M → pk(k,M),
(p6) M → sk(k,M).
Let us consider a seed term represented by the initial grammar
G0sd1 ≡ Z /∈ I → pk(k′, Z)∈L.
This seed term asks whether the intruder can learn any message encrypted with the key k′ provided that the message
itself is unknown. The grammar generation process never terminates for this seed term, as shown in the generated
grammars of Fig. 6. The point is that at each grammar generation step, there are several backwards narrowing steps of
the form




t |p /∈ I → pk(k′, A; t)∈L
and each of these pre-grammar rules t |p /∈ I → pk(k′, A; t)∈L is not captured by the previous grammar. Thus, we can
apply heuristic H3 to each of them, obtaining a new rule where the variable t |p is replaced by a new variable, i.e., the
very same t |p /∈ I → pk(k′, A; t)∈L. Moreover, these new rules are not implied from the previous ones, and thus they
are not removed by the optimization stage. A similar argument exists for grammar productions in Fig. 6 of the form
t |p∈L → pk(k′, A; sk(k′, t))∈L and the heuristic H1.
6.6. Grammar unreachability
This section introduces the main theorems regarding soundness of the grammars, i.e., if a message m belongs to the
language of a grammar G!sdi obtained from a seed term sdi , then such message cannot be learned by the intruder.
Note that the user starts the grammar generation process providing a seed term that he/she believes that the intruder
cannot learn. Therefore, these seed terms may be unsound, and must be reﬁned during the grammar generation process
to more precise sound versions. Intermediate grammars might also be unsound, since further backwards protocol steps
must be explored to reﬁne the intermediate grammar. Therefore, we can prove soundness of the grammars only at the
end, for the ﬁxpoint grammars. Only at this ﬁnal state do we know that every possible protocol step has been analyzed
for every possible message belonging to the current grammar.
The following properties establish that, whenever we have a protocol state SS and a message m that the intruder must
learn, i.e., that appears as an input message m− in the past part of some strand of SS, and that it is in the language of a
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Fig. 6. Inﬁnite grammar generation sequence in Example 30.
grammar G!sdi , then for every previous state SS






there is a message m′ that the intruder must also learn, i.e., m′ is an input message of the past part of some strand
of SS′. This fact, together with the assumption that the intruder does not know anything in an initial state, are the
basis of the soundness of the grammars. However, grammars are generated using the rewrite theory RSP instead of the
rewrite theory RP and therefore we must rephrase the previous statement in terms of RSP . That is, whenever we have
a message m that is in the language of a grammar G!sdi , for every previous set u1, . . . , uk of messages obtained by the





u1, . . . , uk
there is a message ui that the intruder must learn and that it is also in the grammar G!sdi .




Corollary 3. Let Gkj be a grammar. If g ≡ (C → t∈L) is a grammar rule in Gkj that is in normal form w.r.t. the
relationP−1,Gkj−1
, then either:















g′′, then g′′ is not Gkj -expandable,
i.e., g′′ ≡ (D → (t1, . . . , tn)∈L) and either
(a) D is not  -satisﬁable, or
(b) D is  -satisﬁable and ∃ti s.t. 〈Gkj ,D〉  (ti∈L) or (ti /∈ I) in D.
The following auxiliary corollary follows in a straightforward way from the deﬁnition of the relationP,Gkj ,s .
Corollary 4. If G! is the ﬁxpoint w.r.t. P,G,s of a grammar G, then for all g ≡ (C → t∈L) in G!, g is in normal
form w.r.t. the relationP−1,G!−1 .
The following result states that, given a narrowing sequence from a term t with a substitution , then we can simulate
 by narrowing just from t.
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Theorem 7. Let R = (,, E,R) be a topmost rewrite theory, t, t ′ ∈ T(X ), and ,  be substitutions such that
(t)∗,R,E t ′. Then, there are substitutions ,  and a term t ′′ such that t∗,R,E t
′′
, ((t)) ≡ ((t)), and t ′ ≡ (t ′′).
Proof. (t)∗,R,E t ′ implies ((t)) →∗R,E t ′, and then, by Theorem 2 there are substitutions ,  and a term t ′′
such that t ∗,R,E t
′′
, ((t)) ≡ ((t)), and t ′ ≡ (t ′′). 
Now, we state and prove the following key result for the simpliﬁed protocol rules.
Lemma 4. If G! is the ﬁxpoint w.r.t. P,G,s of a grammar G. Let C be a term of sort CtrSet such that it does
not contain any constraint of the form _∈L and t be a term of sort Msg such that 〈G!, C〉  (t∈L). Then, for each




u1, . . . , un such that (C) is  -satisﬁable, there is a ui such that
〈G!, (C)〉  (ui∈L) or (ui /∈ I) occurs in (C).
Proof. 〈G!, C〉  (t∈L) implies there is Ct such that 	 ≡ (t∈L) →!G ,R−1G! ,EG
Ct , and Ct  C. Let us take g ≡
D → s∈L as the grammar rule applied in the ﬁrst rewrite step of 	. There is a substitution  such that t ≡ (s) and






Now, let us focus on g. By Theorem 7 and SP (_→_) = {1}, g can simulate t•,SP ,R−1SP ,ESPu1, . . . , un, i.e.,
there are substitutions ,  and terms s1, . . . , sn such that g •,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP
g′, g′ ≡ (D) → (s1, . . . , sn)∈L,
(t) ≡ ((s)), ui ≡ (si) for 1 in, and ((D)) ≡ ((D)).
Since G(_→_) = {2}, ((D)) →!G ,R−1G! ,EG
(Ct ) can be partially simulated by g′ and rewriting, i.e., there




g′′, g′′ ≡ D′ → (s1, . . . , sn)∈L, and (D′) →!G ,R−1G! ,EG






(D) → (s1, . . . , sn)∈L and
(D) → (s1, . . . , sn)∈L →!G ,R−1G! ,EG
D′ → (s1, . . . , sn)∈L
such that (t) ≡ ((s)) ≡ ((s)), ui ≡ (si) and





(D′) →!G ,R−1G! ,EG
(Ct ).
Since G! is a ﬁxpoint grammar, by Corollary 4, we have that g is a normal form w.r.t. P−1,G!−1 . By Corollary 3,








g′′, there is a sj such that either 〈G!,D′〉  (sj∈L) or
(sj /∈ I) occurs in D′. Note that D′ is  -satisﬁable because (C) is, i.e., by Lemma 1, (Ct )  (C), by Corollary 1,
(Ct ) is  -satisﬁable, by Corollary 2, Ct is  -satisﬁable, then, since terms rooted by _  _ are normal forms w.r.t.
RG! , we have that all constraints of the form _  _ in (D′) are constraints of (Ct ), thus making (D′)  -satisﬁable,
and ﬁnally, by Corollary 2, D′ is  -satisﬁable.
Now, recall that ui ≡ (si) for 1 in. If (sj /∈ I) occurs in D′, then ((sj ) /∈ I) occurs in (D′). Since terms
rooted by _ /∈ I are normal forms w.r.t. RG! , ((sj ) /∈ I) occurs in (Ct ). And, since (Ct )  (C) (recall that
w /∈ I  w /∈ I only), ((sj ) /∈ I) occurs also in (C).
If (sj /∈ I) does not occur in D′, we have that 〈G!,D′〉  (sj∈L). Since C does not contain any constraint of the form
_∈L, Ct neither. Since (D′) →!G ,R−1G! ,EG
(Ct ), we have that any constraint of the form w∈L appearing in (D′)
is deducible from (Ct ), i.e., 〈G!, (Ct )〉  (w∈L) for each w∈L in (D′). Thus, 〈G!, (D′)〉  ((sj )∈L) implies
〈G!, (Ct )〉  ((sj )∈L). Finally, by Theorem 6, 〈G!, (C)〉 ((sj )∈L). 
Now we state and prove the following result for the protocol rules.
200 S. Escobar et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 162–202
Theorem 8. If G! is the ﬁxpoint w.r.t.P,G,s of a grammar G. Let SS be a term of sort State. If SS is not G!-safe,




SS′, SS′ is not G!-safe.
Proof. Recall that SS being not G!-safe means that there is a term t of sort Msg such that [ l1, t−, l2 | l′ ] appears in
SS for terms l1, l2, l′ of sort SMsgList, and for IK being the intruder knowledge in SS, either (t /∈ I) appears in IK or











where ′ ≡ ↓Var(mset(SS)). Let us consider that t is the term of sortMsgmaking SS not beingG!-safe. So, t ∈ mset(SS).
If mset(SS′) ≡ mset(SS), then we are done. Otherwise, mset(SS′) ≡ (mset(SS) \ {t}) ∪ {u1, . . . , uk} such that
t •
′′,SP ,R−1SP ,ESP
u1, . . . , uk,
where ′′ ≡ ′↓Var(t). Then, by Lemma 4, there is ui such that 〈G!, (ﬁlter/∈(IK))〉  (ui∈L) or (ui∈L) occurs in
(ﬁlter/∈(IK)). Therefore, the conclusion follows. 
And our main theorem in this section is the following one.
Theorem 9 (Grammar unreachability). Let P be a protocol. Let G! be the ﬁxpoint of a grammar G. Let SS be a State




SS′ where SS′ is an initial state
term.
Proof. To prove this theorem we use the fact that an intruder does not know in an initial state, see Deﬁnition 5, any of
the terms belonging to the grammars generated in the language. Then, the conclusion follows by repeated application
of Theorem 8. 
7. Concluding remarks
We have given a precise rewriting-based formalization of the NPA reachability analysis and language generation
mechanisms that we call Maude-NPA. And we have illustrated its use by means of a well-known protocol. We have
implemented both the reachability analysis and the grammar generation inference systems based on rewriting and
narrowing in the Maude rewriting logic language [7]. This prototype has been used to produce all the grammar-
generation examples in the paper. We have also proved several meta-logical properties of the inference system, in
particular that terms produced by the grammar-generation algorithm represent unreachable states in the reachability
analysis.
As pointed out in the Introduction, this work is a ﬁrst step within a longer-term research project to use NPA-like
mechanisms in the analysis of protocols for which attacks may make use of the algebraic properties of underlying
cryptographic functions. Much work remains ahead including:
(1) Formalization of NPA’s other techniques for search space reduction, including various types of partial order
reduction.
(2) Generalization of our inference system to handle equational theories for the underlying cryptography; this should
take the form of a modular inference system in which such equational theories are a parameter.
(3) Based on (1) and (2), development of a next-generation tool based on the generalized inference system and having
a rewriting-based implementation.
(4) Furthermore, the meta-logical properties of the current inference system and of its generalization based on their
precise rewriting semantics should be systematically studied. Besides proving the types of theorems that we have
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proved in this paper, but for more general types of equational theories, we also want to characterize the types of
languages and protocols for which termination of the reachability analysis process is guaranteed, and to characterize
the conditions under which the language generation process itself terminates. If successful, this will provide us
with a class of protocols for which we can guarantee that NPA-style reachability analysis always returns an answer.
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Appendix A. The narrowing relation •
,,R,E
The narrowing relation•,,R,E is entirely similar to the narrowing modulo E relation,,R,E , except that the
uniﬁcation algorithm modulo E and its corresponding set of uniﬁers are modiﬁed as explained below, and the variables
of sort Fresh are treated in a special way.
t
p•,,R,E t
′ if there is a non--frozen position p ∈ Pos(t), a (possibly renamed) rule l → r in R such that
Var(t)∩ (Var(l)∪Var(r)) = ∅, and a E-uniﬁer  ∈ CSU•
E,(t |p = l,W) for Var(t)∪Var(l)∪Var(r) ⊆ W
such that t ′ = (t[r]p) and VarFresh(t) ∪ VarFresh(l) ∪ VarFresh(r) ⊆ Dom()
where the set of uniﬁers CSU•
E,(u = v,W) is deﬁned by
↓V ∈ CSU•E,(u = v,W) for V = Var(u) ∪ Var(v) and V ⊆ W if u •	 v!B,,, • E True, where we add the
frozenness requirement ( •	 ) = {1} and we assume that the equations E can be viewed as ﬁnite set of rewrite
rules E, and where • E is the set of rewrite rules • E = E ∪ {x •	 x → True}.
In other words, in this modiﬁed procedure, when unifying two terms u and v modulo the equations E by basic
narrowing with the rules E, we begin with the expression u •	 v and try to reach the term True, but the frozenness of
•	 does not allow the rules in E to be applied to the term u: they can only be applied to v. Only in the end, by narrowing
with the rule x •	 x → True, is a ﬁnal uniﬁcation of u with the narrowed right term performed.
The reason for using this modiﬁed narrowing relation•,,R,E in the NPA is that when narrowing from input terms
t1, . . . , tm to output terms s1, . . . , sk , the terms t1, . . . , tm are assumed to be strongly → E-irreducible, whereas the
output terms s1, . . . , sk are not necessarily strongly → E-irreducible. This is because the terms t1, . . . , tm represent
messages already received by a principal so that encryptions/decryptions have already been applied and, therefore, the
terms have been simpliﬁed. Instead, the terms s1, . . . , sk , represent newly produced terms (messages) that have not yet
been simpliﬁed.
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